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1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 he legal concept of “public policy” defies easy explanation, or—to be more 
accurate—it can be defined in so many ways as to be seemingly neither a definitive 
concept nor a particularly “legal” one. Public policy expresses “the social, moral, and 
economic values” of society. 1  Its objective is “the common good.” 2  It prohibits acts  
“injurious to the public, or against the public good.”3 
But while public policy involves morality, it is not only morality.
4
 It is often vague,
5
 
it is “variable,”6 and its meaning stretches7and changes depending on the circumstances8 
and surroundings, like the skin of a “chameleon.”9 It was perhaps most famously described 
almost two hundred years ago by Judge Burrough as “a very unruly horse, and when once 
you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from sound law. 
It is never argued at all, but when other points fail.”10 
Public policy is, above all, a product of the courts: “a judicial construct prohibiting 
courts from enforcing illegal contracts or contracts that, while not illegal per se, are against 
public interests.”11 
                                                 
1. Sulbha Rai, How Do or Should Arbitrators Deal with Domestic Public Policy or Regulatory Issues. 
Does It Affect Arbitrability?, Jindal Global Law Sch. Working Papers Series (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433799; cf. Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Court Review of Competition Law 
Awards in Setting Aside and Enforcement Proceedings, in EU AND US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION 758 
(Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds., 2011) (“Although there are many definitions of this concept, public 
policy can be, broadly speaking, defined as the basic values and principles of a given domestic system.”). 
2. Richard H.W. Maloy, Public Policy – Who Should Make It in America’s Oligarchy?, 1998 DET. C.L. 
REV. 1143, 1154 (1998). 
3. Egerton v. Brownlow, [1853] 10 Eng. Rep. 359 (Q.B.) 437; 4 H.L.C. 1 (H.L.) 196 (Eng.). 
4. See Jones v. Randall, [1774] 98 Eng. Rep. 954 (K.B.) 955; 1 Cowper 37, 39 (Mansfield, L.) (Eng.) 
(“Many contracts which are not against morality are still void as being against the maxims of sound policy.”). 
5. See FRANÇOIS KNOEPFLER ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ SUISSE 457 n.776f (3d ed. 2004). 
6. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 175 U.S. 91, 106 (1899) (“Public policy is 
variable; the very reverse of that which is the policy of the public at one time may become public policy at 
another; hence no fixed rule can be given by which to determine what is public policy.”). 
7. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND 
ENFORCING 137 (3d ed. 2010) (“[C]reative counsel can often construct public policy . . . arguments, which 
can delay enforcement efforts. . . .  he elasticity of ‘public policies’ in most states heightens [the] uncertainty 
[this creates].”). 
8. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933) (“ he public policy of one generation may not, under 
changed conditions, be the public policy of another.”). 
9. Bernard Dutoit, L’ordre public: caméléon du droit international privé?, in GUY FLATTET, MÉLANGES 
455 (1985). 
10. Richardson v. Mellish, [1824] 130 Eng. Rep. 294 (Ct. Com. Pl.) 303; 2 Bing. 229, 252 (Burrough, J.) 
(Eng.); but see Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. The Football Association Ltd., [1971] Ch. 591, 606–67 
(“[W]ith a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles. It can 
leap the fences put up by fictions and come down on the side of justice.”). 
11. Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between Legal and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall 
Street Associates and the Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597, 598 (2008–
2009). 
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1.1 International Arbitration 
International arbitration is an integral element of the modern globalized economy. It 
is “the principal method of resolving disputes between States, 12  individuals, and 
corporations in almost every aspect of international trade, commerce, and investment.”13 
Predictability of outcomes and reduction of uncertainty are essential to commerce and 
investment.
14
 Commercial buyers and sellers utilize the standardized guidelines and rules 
of procedure of private arbitral institutions to resolve contractual disputes.
15
 Recourse to 
investment arbitration allows private parties to invest with confidence in developing 
nations by ensuring that any disputes will be decided in a neutral forum.
16
 
Rooted in the notion of party autonomy, arbitration allows contracting parties to 
resolve disputes with little or no State intervention.
17
 The disputing parties can utilize 
arbitration to bypass national substantive and procedural laws.
18
 In most international 
arbitrations, neither the arbitral proceeding nor its outcome is subject to review in State 
court.
19
 International arbitral awards are enforceable in “virtually all developed nations of 
the world.”20 
International commercial arbitration “depends for its effectiveness on a reliable 
scheme for enforcement in one country of awards made in another, and that is only feasible 
if the grounds for refusal of enforcement of foreign awards are limited (and so reasonably 
predictable), and are applied by most, and preferably all, trading countries.” 21 Most 
                                                 
12.  his article concerns several varieties of “states”.  he term “states” with a lowercase “s” is used to 
refer to the fifty states of the United States of America.  he term “State” with uppercase “S” is used to 
designate nations/countries. Finally, the States comprising the EU are referred to as “Member States.” 
13. NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, ALAN REDFERN & J. MARTIN HUNTER, REDFERN AND 
HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1 (2009) [hereinafter REDFERN & HUNTER]; see, e.g., YVES 
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE 311 (1996). 
14. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter BORN 2011] (“ he international legal regimes for international commercial and investment 
arbitrations have been established, and progressively refined, with the express goal of facilitating 
international trade and investment by providing a stable, predictable, and effective legal framework in which 
these commercial activities may be conducted.”). 
15. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 13, at 1–2. 
16. Id. at 15–16 
17. See, e.g.  ¸JULIAN M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
[hereinafter LEW, MISTELIS & KRÖLL] 5 (2003); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 13, at 2. 
18. See, e.g.  ¸MICHAEL MCILWRATH & JOHN SAVAGE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 8 
(2010); LEW, MISTELIS & KRÖLL, supra note 17, at 5–9. 
19. LEW, MISTELIS & KRÖLL, supra note 17, at 7. 
20. Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A “Second Look” at International 
Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 453 (1999). 
21. JEAN-LOUIS DELVOLVÉ ET AL., FRENCH ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE: A DYNAMIC CIVIL LAW 
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 211 (2d ed. 2009). 
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international arbitral awards are complied with voluntarily.
22
 For the purposes of this 
thesis, arbitration is understood as a mechanism for dispute settlement that is not 
compulsory under domestic law, is based on an agreement between the parties to the 
dispute, in which at least one of the parties is a business undertaking or natural person, and 
the outcome of which, in principle, has the same force as a final and binding judgment.
23
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with commercial arbitration. 
1.2 Impetus for Research 
Public policy is relevant to arbitration law. Arbitration relies on the notion of party 
autonomy—that the parties to an agreement may freely choose the law applicable to their 
agreement and to the resolution of any dispute arising out of it. However, agreements have 
to be performed and arbitral awards rendered somewhere, and in the modern world in 
which the preeminent legal authority is the sovereign State, these actions necessarily occur 
under a legal framework and a public policy not shaped by the parties.
24
 Parties may agree 
to what they like but law has never guaranteed without exception to enforce their 
contracts.
25
 Public policy “by definition goes beyond the will of the parties and cannot be 
waived by their mere agreement.”26 It can be misused to delay, prolong, or make unduly 
expensive the resolution of disputes to the unfair advantage of one party.
27
 
When rules of public policy are implicated in the agreement underlying a dispute in 
arbitration—or in the award resulting from the for arbitration proceedings, a State must 
navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis of lending its authority to the recognition of an 
agreement or enforcement of an award contrary to its fundamental principles or of 
                                                 
22. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 369 (2012) 
23. CHRISTOPH LIEBSCHER, THE HEALTHY AWARD: CHALLENGE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 4 (2003). 
24. See Rainer Arnold & Elisabeth Meindl, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Public Policy in 
International Arbitration Law, 2011 CZECH (& CENT. EUR.) Y.B. ARB. 87, 88. See also Charles H. Brower II, 
Arbitration and Antitrust: Navigating the Contours of Mandatory Law, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2011) 
(“[I]nternational commercial arbitration holds itself out as a system founded on party autonomy, but 
increasingly unfolds in a setting where tribunals apply public regulatory laws without regard to the law 
selected by the disputing parties.”). 
25. See, e.g., Institutes of Justinian, lib. 3, tit. 19, par. 24 (“Quod turpi ex causa promissum est, veluti si 
quis homicidium vel sacrilegium se facturum promittat, non valet [A promise made to effect a base purpose, 
as to commit homicide or sacrilege, is not binding]”), translated in THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, THE 
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, WITH ENGLISH INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION, AND NOTES 353 (7th ed. 1917); 
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 13, at 655–56 (recognition and enforcement of null and void contracts is 
internationally refused). 
26. Jacob Grierson, Court Review of Awards on Public Policy Grounds: A Recent Decision of the English 
Commercial Court Throws Light on the Position Under the English Arbitration Act 1996, 24 MEALY’S INT’L 
ARB. REP. 1, 4 (2009). 
27.  he threat of  ouchstone, the court jester, comes to mind: “I will bandy with thee in faction; will o’er-
run thee with policy.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT act 5, sc. 1. 
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appearing not to respect the principle of finality of arbitral awards underpinning the system 
of modern international commerce.
28
  
What route should national courts—the “watchmen of public policy”29—choose? Is 
it “justifiable and desirable,” as one commentator stated, that “the principle of the absence 
of a control . . . diminish behind the absolute necessity of the respect of international public 
policy?” 30  Or should public policy be viewed as a “safety valve” utilized only in 
emergencies, where recognition and enforcement would be fundamentally at odds with a 
State’s most cherished principles and values?31  
1.3 Structure 
This thesis is organized in Parts (e.g., Part n) sections (e.g., section n.n), subsections 
(e.g., subsection n.n.n), paragraphs (e.g., paragraph n.n.n.n), and subparagraphs (e.g., 
subparagraph n.n.n.n.n). The structure of this thesis is explained below 
 Part 2 details the provisions for refusal of recognition or enforcement of arbitral 
awards on the grounds of public policy that currently exist in major international 
conventions and model legislation as well as in the legislation of the United States (“US”) 
and selected European Union (“EU”) Member States.32 The various ways in which public 
policy can be understood are explored in Part 3. The application of the public policy 
exception in the US and selected EU Member States are detailed in Part 4. In Part 5, trends 
in the US and the EU with respect to public policy and arbitration are examined. Part 6 
concludes the thesis. 
2 SPECIFIC PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTIONS 
Part 2 details the relevant international conventions and national legislation 
governing public policy exceptions to enforcement of arbitral awards. First, in section 2.1, 
                                                 
28. Rai, supra note 1, at 5. 
29. Bernard Hanotiau & Olivier Caprasse, Arbitrability, Due Process, and Public Policy Under Article V 
of the New York Convention, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 721, 737 (2008). 
30. Hanotiau & Caprasse, supra note 29, at 738 (internal quotes omitted).  
31. Brozolo, supra note 1, at 758. 
32. See, e.g.  ¸Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(2)(b), 
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]; Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration art. 5(2)(b), opened for signature Jan. 30, 1975, OAS 
SER A20 (SEPEF), 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; Convention on the Judicial 
Cooperation between States of the Arab League art. 37, Apr. 8 1983, available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/3ae6b38d8.html (last accessed Apr. 9, 2013); but see Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (silent 
on issue of public policy). 
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the exception found in the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) is detailed. 33 
Second, in section 2.2, the framework for national laws regarding recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards provided by the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Model Law”) is explained.34 In section 2.3, the 
implementation of these international conventions and the UNCITRAL Model Law with 
respect to public policy exceptions in the actual national legislation of the US and selected 
EU Member States is explored in detail. Finally, in section 2.4, the aforementioned public 
policy exception provisions are summarized. 
2.1 Public policy exception to enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York 
Convention 
The New York Convention was signed in 1958 and has since been acceded to by 
nearly 150 States.
35
 It is the “cornerstone of current international commercial arbitration”36 
and the “backbone of [its] acceptance . . . by the business world.” 37  The New York 
Convention concerns the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards—“arbitral 
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and 
enforcement of such awards are sought”38—and non-domestic arbitral awards—“arbitral 
awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and 
                                                 
33. See New York Convention, supra note 32. The New York Convention has entered into force in 148 
States worldwide, including all twenty-seven EU Member States, the soon-to-be Member State, Croatia; and 
all five current candidate States; Iceland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and 
Turkey. A regularly updated list is available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 
NYConvention_status.html. 
34. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, G.A. Res. 40/72, 40 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (June 21, 1985), revised 
in 2006, G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. Doc. A/61/33 (Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ 
en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law forms the basis of arbitration laws (as of April 2013) in several states in the US; the 
following EU Member States: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland; the soon-to-be EU Member State Croatia; and the following EU Member State candidates: Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey. A regularly updated list is available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html. 
35. New York Convention, supra note 32. 
36. BORN 2011, supra note 14, at 33. 
37. LEW, MISTELIS & KRÖLL, supra note 17, at v. 
38. New York Convention, supra note 32, art. I(1). 
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enforcement are sought.”39 Arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention may be 
the product of either ad hoc or institutional arbitration proceedings.
40
 
States party to the New York Convention (“Contracting States”) must recognize 
agreements in writing entered into by the parties that provide for arbitration of all disputes 
between the parties “capable of settlement by arbitration.”41 The courts of Contracting 
States, when seized of an action wherein the parties have such an agreement, must refer the 
dispute to arbitration.
42
 Contracting States must also “recognize arbitral awards as binding 
and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the 
award is relied upon.”43 Contracting States may not impose “substantially more onerous 
conditions or higher fees or charges” on recognition or enforcement of awards under the 
New York Convention than are imposed on recognition or enforcement of domestic 
arbitral awards.
44
 
Many Contracting States, including the US and the Member States of the EU 
primarily considered in this thesis—France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the “UK”)—have made a special reservation to the 
New York Convention stipulating that they will only apply the Convention to the 
recognition and enforcement of award made in the territory of another Contracting State.
45
 
If arbitration takes place in a State that is not a party to the New York Convention, the 
resulting award cannot be enforced in a Contracting State under the reservation. 
2.1.1 The New York Convention’s public policy exception to recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards 
Arbitral awards under the New York Convention are generally challenged on three 
grounds: jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive.
46
 Jurisdictional challenges call the 
existence of a valid and binding arbitration clause into question.
47
 Procedural challenges on 
                                                 
39. Id. 
40. See id. art. I(2) (“ he term ‘arbitral awards’ shall include not only awards made by arbitrators 
appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have 
submitted.”). 
41. Id. art. II(1) An “agreement in writing” consists of an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration 
agreement that is either “signed by the parties” or “contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.” Id. art. 
II(2). 
42. Id. art. II(3). 
43. Id. art. III. 
44. Id. 
45. A list of reservations to the New York Convention is available at http://treaties.un.org/pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en#15. 
46. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 13, at 594–95. 
47. See New York Convention, supra note 32, art. V(1)(a), (c) (dispute not within scope of agreement). 
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focus on problems in the mechanics of arbitration: appointment of arbitrators, giving 
proper notice, and so forth.
48
 Substantive challenges to arbitral awards allege that the 
deciding tribunal made a mistake of law or fact when rendering its decision or that the 
award is contrary to public policy.
49
 The latter situation is the subject of this thesis.  
Specifically, Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention provides that an arbitral 
award may be refused recognition and enforcement if the competent authority in the 
country where recognition and enforcement are sought finds that “recognition and 
enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”50 
2.1.2 How the Article V(2)(b) challenge works 
When the party against whom an award has been rendered (the “award-debtor”) 
seeks to challenge an award on substantive grounds, it has two procedural paths. First, it 
may seek to have the award “set aside” or “annulled” by the competent authority of the 
State in which the award was rendered.
51
 An award that has been aside in the State in 
which it was rendered may then be refused recognition and enforcement by other States 
party to the New York Convention.
52
 Refusing recognition and enforcement is permissible, 
but not obligatory. Notwithstanding that caveat, when an award is set aside by the 
competent authority of the State in which it was rendered, the efforts of parties seeking to 
enforce it will be stymied. Thus, on the basis of the public policy of the rendering State, 
parties may be able to thwart enforcement proceedings in States with different (and less 
strict) public policy standards. 
However, where an award cannot be challenged on the basis of the public policy of 
the rendering State, its enforcement may still be inhibited in other States if it can be 
successfully challenged on the basis of the public policy of the enforcing State. This is a 
sensible for the award-debtor, because, as Delvolvé notes, “the grounds for refusal of 
                                                 
48. See id. art. V(1)(b), (d) (composition of tribunal or arbitral procedure not in accordance with 
agreement). 
49. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 13, at 596. 
50. See New York Convention, supra note 32, art. V(2)(b). “Recognition and enforcement of the award 
may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the 
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that ... [t]he recognition or 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” 
51. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 34, art. 6 (“Each State enacting this model law speciﬁes the 
court, courts or, where referred to therein, other authority competent to perform these function.”). 
52. See New York Convention, supra note 32, art. V(1)(e); see also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 13, 
at 618 (noting that an award that has been set aside “will usually be unenforceable elsewhere”). 
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enforcement may be wide in one country and narrow in another.”53 Consider, for example, 
an award rendered in State A concerning a State B company having the majority of its 
assets located in State C. The party in whose favor the award was rendered (the “award-
creditor”) would naturally be most concerned with securing enforcement in State C so it 
can receive payment from the assets located therein. If the award-debtor convinces the 
competent authority in State A to set aside the award, it would then be able to deflect 
enforcement proceedings in State C on New York Convention V(1)(e) grounds.
54
 Where 
the award-debtor fails to convince the competent authority in State A to set aside the 
award, it could still avoid enforcement in State C if recognition or enforcement of the 
award would be contrary to the public policy of State C. 
2.2 Public policy exception to enforcement of arbitral awards under the 
UNCITRAL Model Law 
Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that a foreign arbitral award may 
be denied confirmation or recognition on statutory grounds virtually identical to those of 
Article V of the New York Convention.
55
 Article 36(1)(b)(ii) provides that recognition or 
enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused . . . “if the court finds that . . . the 
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of [that] 
State.”56 
Because the UNCITRAL Model Law is a recommended blueprint for actually 
binding legislation—i.e., an instrument of soft rather than hard law, no further discussion 
of its provisions is necessary at this point. The following section will compare provisions 
of actual national legislation with those suggested in the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
2.3 Public policy exception to enforcement of arbitral awards in legislation of the 
US and select EU Member States 
National legislation regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards departs from that 
suggested by the UNCITRAL Model Law. Two main trends can be distinguished: (1) 
different enforcement regimes for foreign awards subject to international treaties (“covered 
awards”) than for those not subject (“non-covered awards”); (2) basically the same 
                                                 
53. DELVOLVÉ ET AL., supra note 21, at 210; see also id., at 210–11 (“In such situations, the same award 
would thus be enforceable in one country, but not in another.”). 
54. See New York Convention, supra note 32, art. V(1)(e). 
55. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 34, art. 36. 
56. Id. art. 36(1)(b)(ii). 
  
9 
enforcement regimes applicable to all foreign awards. The US, the Netherlands, and the 
UK exemplify the first trend, whereas France exemplifies the second. 
2.3.1 Different enforcement regimes under national law for arbitral awards 
based on whether the award is subject to an international treaty 
The major proponent of providing a different enforcement regime under national law 
to covered awards than that applicable to non-covered awards is the US. The legal systems 
of the UK and the Netherlands make a similar distinction. 
2.3.1.1 US provides different enforcement regimes for covered and non-covered 
awards under the FAA 
In the US, different enforcement regimes apply to non-domestic arbitral awards 
subject to the New York Convention or the Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (“Panama Convention”) (i.e., covered awards) than to domestic 
awards (i.e., non-covered awards).
57
 Both regimes, however, are defined by US federal 
law. The US Congress enacted the first federal legislation concerning arbitration in 1925, 
the United States Arbitration Act.
58
 The legislation was renamed the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”) in 1947.59 Prior to the New York Convention’s entry into force in the US, the 
FAA was amended to ensure the Convention’s enforcement.60 It was similarly modified 
later to include awards under the Panama Convention.
61
 Thus, the FAA governs the 
enforcement of all arbitral awards in the US,
62
 but provides differing regimes for domestic 
awards, awards subject to the New York Convention, and awards subject to the Panama 
Convention.  
By providing a remedy in the federal courts, the FAA places agreements to arbitrate 
“upon the same footing as other contracts”63 and ensures their judicial enforcement.64 The 
FAA provides that agreements in writing to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and 
                                                 
57. Richard C. Levin & C. Jeffrey Price, US Enforcement Issues and US Antitrust Law, in EU AND US 
ANTITRUST ARBITRATION 1450 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds., 2011). 
58. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 
201–208, 301–307 (2012)). 
59. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 
201–208, 301–307 (2012)). 
60. Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, § 3, 84 Stat. 693 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, 
201–208, 301–307 (2012)). 
61. Act of Aug. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-369, § 2, 104 Stat. 450 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
16, 201–208, 301–307 (2012)). 
62. See FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) ( he FAA covers all “maritime transactions [and] transactions 
involving commerce.”). 
63. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1 (1924). 
64. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1985). 
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enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.” 65  It evidences a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration” 66  and the 
“fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”67 The FAA requires federal 
courts to treat arbitration agreements as equal to other contracts
68
 and to “enforce them 
according to their terms.”69 
Where an arbitration agreement exists, federal courts are empowered to stay court 
proceedings until “such arbitration has been had.” 70  Parties to court proceeding may 
petition federal district courts for “an order directing that such arbitration proceed.”71 The 
courts are directed to hear the parties and, upon determining the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, to issue “an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement.”72 
Federal courts may apply the New York Convention to all “non-domestic” awards. 
This includes both awards issued abroad and those issued in the US but made pursuant to 
the legal framework of another country. An award made pursuant to foreign law or 
involving parties that are domiciled or have their principal place of business outside of the 
US qualifies as non-domestic for purposes of the New York Convention.
73
 
2.3.1.1.1 Public policy exception to enforcement of domestic awards under the FAA 
The FAA provides no basis for vacating or refusing to recognize or enforce a 
domestic award on grounds that it is contrary to public policy.
74
 Generally, federal courts 
                                                 
65. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
66. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
67. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010). 
68. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, 
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). 
69. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 
70. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). 
71. Id. § 4. 
72. Id. 
73. See Levin & Price, supra note 57, at 1451–52; see also Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 
928, 931 (2d Cir. 1983). This distinction is not unlike that made in French law, as discussed below. 
74. The vast majority of US state arbitration laws also omit any explicit reference to public policy. See 
ALA. CODE § 6-6-14 (West 2013); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.43.500 (West 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-
1512 (West 2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-223 (West 2011); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1268.4 (West 2013); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-223 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5714 (West 2009); D.C. CODE 
§ 16-4423 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.13 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13 (West 2013); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 658A-23 (West 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-912 (West 2013); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
ch. 710 § 5/12 (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-57-2-13 (West 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.12 (West 
2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-412 (West 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.160 (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:4210 (West 2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 5938 (West 2013); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 3-224 (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 12 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
600.5081 (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572B.23 (West 2013); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-15-23 (West 
2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.405 (West 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-312 (West 2013); NEB. REV. 
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may vacate or modify a domestic award only upon the grounds specified in the FAA.
75
 It is 
“well-established,” however that a public policy exception does exist.76 That exception, 
however, is “extremely narrow.”77 To form the basis for vacating a domestic award, a 
public policy must be “explicit,” “well-defined and dominant.”78 “[G]eneral considerations 
of . . . public interests” cannot alone give rise to public policies.79 Instead, public policies 
must be expressly articulated in “laws and legal precedents.”80 Moreover, the party seeking 
to vacate or prevent the recognition or enforcement of a domestic award must show that 
                                                                                                                                                    
STAT. § 25-2613 (West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.241 (West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:8 
(West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-8 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-24 (West 2013); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 7511 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-54 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 32-29.3-23 (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
12, § 1874 (West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.705 (West 2013); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7314 
(West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 10-3-12 (West 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-130 (West 2013); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-24 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-313 (West 2013); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 171.088 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-11-124 (West 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
12, § 5677 (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.010 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.04A.230 
(West 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-10-4 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 788.10 (West 2013); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-36-114 (West 2013). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-136 (West 2013) (allowing 
refusal of recognition or enforcement where “[t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of this state”). 
75. See, e.g., Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980); I/S Stavborg v. 
Nat’l Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1974); Office of Supply v. New York Nav. Co., 
Inc., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972). 
76. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2625 (2009) [hereinafter BORN 
2009] (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 41 (1987); W.R. Grace & Co. v. 
Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1948)). The public policy 
exception is inferred from 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (making arbitral agreements enforceable and irrevocable 
except “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).  he arbitration 
laws of many US states expressly stipulate that similar exception does not exist under state law. See ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 12-1512(A)(5) (“[ ]the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by 
a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.”); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-22-223(1.5) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5714(a)(5) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.13(1)(e) 
(same); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-13(d) (same); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-912(a)(5) (same); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
ch. 710 § 5/12(a)(5) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-57-2-13(a)(5) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.12(2) 
(same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-412(a)(5) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.160(1)(e) (same); ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 14, § 5938(1)(F) (same); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-224(c) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 251, § 12(a)(5) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5081(3) (same); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
435.405(1)(5) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-312(2) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2613(a)(6) (same); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-54(a)(5) (same); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7314(a)(2) (same); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 15-48-130(a)(5) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-24(6) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-
313(a)(2) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5677(b) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.010 (same); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-36-114(a)(5) (same). But see W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-10-4 (“[ ]his section shall not be 
construed to take away the power of courts of equity over awards.”). 
77. See BORN 2009, supra note 76, at 2625.  he public policy exception does not “sanction a broad 
judicial power to set aside arbitration awards as against public policy.” United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 43; 
W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766. 
78. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
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recognition or enforcement would clearly violate that explicit, well-defined and dominant 
policy
81
 and produce a result that the parties could not have lawfully agreed upon.
82
 
2.3.1.1.2 Public policy exception to enforcement of awards subject to the New York 
Convention under the FAA 
The second chapter of the FAA provides for the direct enforcement of the New York 
Convention in federal courts.
83
 Application of the Article V(2)(b) public policy exception 
by federal courts is discussed at length in section 4.1.
84
 
2.3.1.2 The UK provides different enforcement regimes for covered and non-covered 
awards under the EAA 
The United Kingdom’s Arbitration Act of 1996 (“EAA”) provides separate regimes 
for domestic awards (i.e., non-covered awards) and awards under the New York 
Convention (i.e., covered awards). Section 66 of the EAA provides that non-covered 
awards may “be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court to the 
same effect.”85 Recognition or enforcement of covered awards may be refused if “it would 
be contrary to public policy to recognise or enforce the award.”86 
2.3.1.3 The Netherlands provides different enforcement regimes for covered and 
non-covered awards 
The Dutch Code of Civil Procedure provides separate regimes for domestic awards 
(i.e., domestic non-covered awards), foreign awards subject to international treaties 
concerning recognition and enforcement (i.e., covered awards), and foreign awards not 
subject to such treaties (i.e., foreign non-covered awards). 
 For non-covered awards rendered within the Netherlands, Article 1063 provides that 
enforcement may be refused only if the award or the manner in which it was made is 
                                                 
81. See, e.g., Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Mass. Nurses Ass’n, 429 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting public 
policy challenge to award because findings of fact did not establish violation of well-defined and dominant 
public policy); Prudential-Bache Secs, Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting challenge on 
grounds of insufficient showing that award violated asserted public policy). But see BORN 2009, supra note 
76, at 2626 (“It is not clear whether the public policy exception in the US requires proof that enforcement of 
the arbitral award itself would violate applicable public policy or compel conduct that would violate a public 
policy. . . . [It is] more likely [that] the public policy exception in US courts is implicated where the 
substantive claim on which the award is based is contrary to applicable public policy.”). 
82. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 62–63, 67 (2000). 
83. 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2012). 
84. See infra, section 4.1. 
85. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 66(1) (U.K.). 
86. Id. § 103(3). 
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“manifestly contrary to public policy or good morals.”87 For awards not rendered in the 
Netherlands, the enforcement regime differs for covered and non-covered awards.
88
  
Article 1076 of Dutch Code of Civil Procedure applies to recognition and 
enforcement proceedings for foreign non-covered awards.
89
 Such awards may be 
recognized and enforced in the Netherlands unless the party seeking to avoid enforcement 
can prove that a valid arbitral agreement is lacking, the tribunal was improperly constituted 
or exceeded its mandate, or the award is subject to appeal or has been vacated in the 
country where it was made.
90
 Non-covered foreign awards may be refused recognition or 
enforcement in the Netherlands if the Dutch court seized of the dispute “finds that the 
recognition or enforcement would be contrary to public policy.”91 
Article 1075, in turn, applies to the recognition and enforcement of covered awards. 
Article 1075 provides that an arbitral award made in a foreign State to which the New 
York Convention applies may be recognized and enforced in the Netherlands.
92
 Thus, the 
Article V(2)(b) public policy exception must be taken into consideration when recognition 
or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention is sought in the 
Netherlands. Just as Chapter 2 of the FAA directly incorporates the text of the New York 
Convention (including the public policy exception) into US federal law, Article 1075 of the 
Dutch Code of Civil Procedure makes foreign awards recognizable and enforceable 
according to the text of the New York Convention. 
2.3.2 Same enforcement regime under national law for foreign arbitral awards 
subject to and not subject to international treaties 
2.3.2.1 France applies the same enforcement regime under the Nouveau code de 
procedure civile to foreign arbitral awards subject to and not subject to 
international treaties 
The French Nouveau code de procedure civile (New Code of Civil Procedure) 
(“N.C.P.C.”)93 adopts an exclusive list of statutory grounds for denying recognition to 
foreign arbitral awards regardless of whether the award is subject to the New York 
Convention. Scholars have argued that by not adopting verbatim the grounds for denial of 
                                                 
87. Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering [RV] [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 1063 (Neth.), 
translated in Neth. Arb. Inst., The Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986, 4 J. INT’L ARB. 127, 139–40 (1987). 
88. See RV arts. 1075–76, translated in Neth. Arb. Inst., supra note 87, at 143–44. 
89. RV art. 1076, translated in Neth. Arb. Inst., supra note 87, at 144. 
90. RV art. 1076(1)(A)(a)–(b), translated in Neth. Arb. Inst., supra note 87, at 144. 
91. RV art. 1076(1)(B), translated in Neth. Arb. Inst., supra note 87, at 144. 
92. RV art. 1075, translated in Neth. Arb. Inst., supra note 87, at 143. 
93. NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] (Fr.); 
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recognition and enforcement provided in the Convention, France’s regime is made more 
favorable to parties seeking enforcement.
94
 
France distinguishes between domestic and international arbitrations. It uniquely 
defines an arbitration as “international” on the sole basis that, in the arbitration, 
“international interests are at stake.”95 Thus, unlike under the laws of the US, the UK, and 
the Netherlands, under French law, the territory in which the award was made does not 
determine whether it is international. Instead, that classification depends on the existence 
of a dispute regarding international interests. Poudret and Besson have noted that a 
“material or immaterial cross border transfer” is the “essential criterion” of such 
international interests.
96
 And, in fact, the Paris Court of Appeal has even emphasized that a 
contract drafted in French, applying French law, and providing for French arbitrators can 
be considered as imputing “international” interests.97  
Within the category of “international arbitration,” French law does distinguish 
between international awards made in France (“domestic international awards”) and those 
made abroad (“foreign international awards”).98  For domestic international awards, the 
only recourse an award-debtor has against enforcement is an action to set aside.
99
 Under 
Article 1520, an award may be set aside where the tribunal wrongly assumed or declined 
jurisdiction, was not properly constituted, or exceeded its mandate; where due process was 
violated; or where recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to 
“international public policy” (l’ordre public international).100 A decision of a French court 
to deny an application to set aside is deemed an enforcement order of the award.
101
 
                                                 
94. See DELVOLVÉ ET AL., supra note 21, at 211. 
95. See N.C.P.C. art. 1054; see also See JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 31 (Stephen Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 2d ed. 2007). 
96. POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 95, at 33 (emphasis added). See HEALTHY AWARD, supra note 23, at 
10. See also Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Nov. 25, 1993, Paco Rabannes Parfums et al. 
v. Les Maisons Paco Rabanne, 1994 REV. ARB. 730 (Fr.) (holding that transborder movement need not 
necessarily have occurred, only that it was intended). 
97. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 18, 1983, Sporprom Serv. B.V. v Polyfrance 
Immo, 1984 REV. ARB. 87 (Fr.). See also Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, June 20, 1996, 
PARIS v. Razel, 1996 REV. ARB. 657 (Fr.); Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Oct. 2, 1982, 
Colas routière et al. v. Tracet, 1992 REV. ARB. 625 (Fr.). Compare Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of 
appeal] Paris, Jan. 13, 1993, SADP v. Editions mondiales, 1995 REV. ARB. 68 (Fr.) (refusing to qualify as 
“international” a transaction in which the part of the contract to be executed abroad was not significant and 
did not concern interests of international commerce). 
98. See DELVOLVÉ ET AL., supra note 21, at 159. 
99. N.C.P.C. art. 1518. 
100. Id. art. 1520 (emphasis added). The distinction between public policy and international public policy 
is discussed further below. 
101. Id. art. 1527. 
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Because a procedure to set aside can only take place in the State where the award is 
rendered, parties seeking to set aside a foreign international award must do so in the State 
where that award was made—i.e., not in France. However, a party seeking to have 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign international award refused in France can only do 
so on the basis that the award does not meet the Article 1520 requirements. Specifically, 
Article 1525 provides that the recognition or enforcement of a foreign international award 
may only be denied on the grounds listed in Article 1520.
102
 Thus, crucially, for both 
domestic and foreign international awards, the applicable public policy exception is not 
that of the New York Convention (recognition and enforcement would be contrary to the 
public policy of the country in which enforcement is sought) but an exception that relies on 
the more ambiguous concept of international public policy.
103
 
By classifying as international all arbitrations in which international interests are 
stake regardless of whether proceedings take place in France or involve French parties and 
denying recognition and enforcement to the resulting awards only where it would be 
contrary to international public policy, French law creates a truly extraterritorial arbitration 
system. That France found it necessary to replace the public policy standard of the New 
York Convention with the narrower international public policy standard indicates that there 
is some dispute between signatories of the New York Convention as to what actually 
comprises “public policy.”  hat issue is discussed at length in the section 3. 
2.4 Summary 
The public policy exception in Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention relates 
explicitly to the public policy of the State in which enforcement or recognition of a foreign 
award is sought.
104
 The exception contained in the UNCITRAL Model Law is nearly 
identical that of the New York Convention. Because the UNCITRAL Model Law is only 
suggested legislation for States to consider in enacting their own legislation, it is helpful to 
compare it to actually enacted national legislation. By doing so, two trends become 
apparent: many States apply separate legal regimes to awards under the New York 
Convention (and other international conventions relating to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign awards) and to awards not under it; fewer States apply the same 
legal regime to awards regardless of whether they are covered by the New York 
                                                 
102. Id. art. 1525. 
103. Id. arts. 1518, 1520, 1525. 
104. New York Convention, supra note 32, art. V(2)(b). 
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Convention. The US, the UK, and the Netherlands are in the former category, whereas 
France is in the latter. 
In the US, the FAA governs the enforcement of all domestic and foreign arbitral 
awards. Separate enforcement regimes apply to foreign awards covered by the New York 
Convention and the Panama Convention and foreign awards not covered by it. Non-
covered for awards are not subject to any statutory public policy exception, although the 
existence of an exception is evident from case law. As in the US, the UK applies separate 
regimes to awards under the New York Convention and awards not under it. English law
105
 
does not expressly stipulate that a public policy exception exists for non-covered awards, 
but does provide that they may be “enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of 
the court to the same effect.” 106  Covered awards may be refused recognition or 
enforcement on public policy grounds equivalent to those included in the New York 
Convention.
107
 As in the US and the UK, in the Netherlands there are separate regimes for 
covered awards and non-covered awards. However, a public policy exception similar to 
that included in the New York Convention applies to both, as well as to domestic awards. 
Unlike in the laws of those three States, French law applies the same enforcement 
regimes to covered foreign arbitral awards as to non-covered foreign arbitral awards. 
However, the N.C.P.C. distinguishes between domestic and foreign “international awards.” 
A public policy exception exists for both varieties, but only if the public policy offended is 
“international.” 
3 WHAT IS PUBLIC POLICY? 
As discussed above, the major international conventions and model legislation 
dedicated to arbitration contain a public policy exception. States also regularly allow a 
public policy escape clause in their national arbitration legislation. At this point, it is 
helpful to explain what “public policy” means. As will be shown, in different contexts, the 
phrase can mean quite different things. Section 3.1 below discusses the ways of 
understanding of “public policy” within the context of the New York Convention. Sections 
3.2 and 3.3 describe the role of “public policy” in the US and the EU, respectively. Each 
                                                 
105. Several legal systems exist within the UK. At all points in this thesis, the law applied by UK courts 
under consideration here is English law. In reality, this is, of course, not the case, but the scope of this work 
does not permit a full inquiry into, inter alia, Scottish law. 
106. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 66(1) (U.K.). 
107. See id. § 103(3). 
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section begins with a brief description of the status of public policy within the respective 
system’s larger federal framework.  
3.1 What is public policy according to Article V(b)(2)? 
Despite its relatively clear language, the public policy exception contained in Article 
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention is the part of the convention “most prone to 
misinterpretation and most open to abuse by national courts, displaying skepticism of non-
national sources of law and bias against foreigners who wish to enforce awards in their 
territories.”108 In the legal systems of most countries that have acceded to the New York 
Convention, there is no guidance whatsoever on how the public policy exception should be 
interpreted.
109
 Courts have referred to arguments under the public policy exception as “the 
last resort of the desperate”110 and dismissed public policy as “a variable notion” 111 that is 
“open-textured and flexible.”112 
According to Gary Born, within the New York Convention, “public policy” does not 
refer only to those public policies of the forum state intended for an international setting 
and consistent with public international law principles. Instead, “public policy” cannot be 
interpreted without considering Article V(b)(2)’s role as an escape clause.113 Thus, public 
policy allows a State to escape from enforcement of an agreement pernicious to its values. 
Born’s view is consistent with the text of Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides that recognition or enforcement may be refused . . . “if 
the court finds that . . . the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to 
the public policy of [the enforcing] State.”114  
However, because the New York Convention leaves the contents of the term “public 
policy” open to interpretation, a number of different approaches to interpreting its meaning 
have been developed. 
                                                 
108. Jan Paulsson, The New York Convention in International Practice: Problems of Assimilation, in THE 
NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958 108 (Marc Blessing ed., 1996). 
109. Troy L. Harris, The “Public Policy” Exception to Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards 
Under the New York Convention, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 9, 11 (2007). 
110. Harris, supra note 109, at 11 (quoting Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. Ras Al 
Khaimah Nat’l Oil Co., [1987] 3 W.L.R. 1023 (C.A.) (Eng.)). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. (quoting Renusagar Power Co. v. General Electric Co., A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 860 (India)). 
113. See BORN 2009, supra note 76, at 2622. 
114. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 34, art. 36(1)(b)(ii). 
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3.1.1 Public policy under the New York Convention is the public policy of the 
enforcing State 
The first approach reads the public policy exception contained in Article V(2)(b) 
narrowly. According to the plain text of the convention, it is the “public policy of that State 
[i.e., the enforcing State]” and only the public policy of the enforcing State that is 
implicated. If the award is contrary to the enforcing State’s public policy, recognition and 
enforcement may be refused.  
3.1.2 Public policy under the New York Convention is international public 
policy 
The second approach responds to concerns that by focusing solely on the public 
policy of the enforcing State, that State could disrupt the effective enforcement of an 
arbitral award concerning multiple parties, multiple States, and a myriad of public policies. 
Scholars have noted that “[public policy] has on occasion also been used by courts in some 
jurisdictions as licence to review—inappropriately—the merits of a dispute.”115 For this 
reason, the concept of “international public policy” has gained prominence in some 
jurisdictions.  
The Committee on International Commercial Arbitration of the International Law 
Association (the “ILA”) has also embraced the second approach. In its Final Report on 
Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards (the “ILA Final 
Report”), the ILA recognized that State courts must “carry out a balancing exercise 
between finality and justice” when a foreign arbitral award conflicts with State public 
policy.
116
  he ILA recommends that finality should be favored, “save in exceptional 
circumstances”117 which “may in particular be found to exist if recognition or enforcement 
of the international arbitral award would be against international public policy.” 118  It 
defines international public policy as “that part of the public policy of a State which, if 
violated, would prevent a party from invoking a foreign law or foreign judgment or foreign 
award.”119  
                                                 
115. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 13, at 615. 
116. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, COMM. ON INT’L COMMERCIAL ARB., FINAL REPORT ON PUBLIC 
POLICY AS A BAR TO ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 2 (2002) [hereinafter ILA FINAL 
REPORT].  
117. ILA FINAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 2, recomm. 1(a). 
118. Id. at 2, recomm. 1(b) (emphasis added). 
119. Id. at 3, ¶ 11.  
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As will be discussed below, French law provides an exception to the enforcement or 
recognition of international arbitral awards on the basis that enforcement or recognition 
would be contrary to international public policy. The meaning of this term in the French 
legal system is similar but not identical to the notion of international public policy 
proposed as the best way of interpreting Article V(2)(b).
120
 
3.1.3 Public policy under the New York Convention is transnational public 
policy 
The ILA provides a third, even more restrictive, concept: “transnational public 
policy” (or “truly international public policy”).121  Transnational public policy includes 
“fundamental rules of natural law, principles of universal justice, jus cogens in public 
international law, and the general principles of morality accepted by . . . ‘civilized 
nations.’” 122  Unlike the national and international interpretations of public policy, 
transnational public policy exists “independently of purely national conceptions of 
international public policy.”123 
Numerous scholars support the transnational public policy view. Blanke & Landolt 
consider the transnational concept to be the only way of interpreting public policy adapted 
to the needs of international trade.
124
 According to the transnational view, an arbitration 
clause is valid except in “cases of fraud, duress, or violation of an internationally 
recognized concept of public policy.”125 Arnold & Meindl point out that because arbitral 
tribunals not bound to a particular State’s legal system, when they apply public policy rules 
in arbitration proceedings, it is a “common international understanding of what public 
policy means,” rather than the public policy of any one State.126 Thus, transnational public 
policy “will even override national mandatory rules of public policy.” 127  However, 
transnational public policy has seen little practical application and is difficult to support 
through a textual reading of the Convention. 
The ILA notes that no court has expressly applied transnational public policy, but 
several cases have concluded that activities such as corruption, drug trafficking, 
                                                 
120. Id. at 2, recomm. 1(b). 
121. Audley Sheppard, Interim ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International 
Arbitral Awards, 19 ARB. INT’L 217, 220 (2003). 
122. Sheppard, supra note 121, at 220; see also Hanotiau & Caprasse, supra note 29, at 731. 
123. DELVOLVÉ ET AL., supra note 21, at 155. 
124. Alexis Mourre, Arbitrability of Antitrust Law from the European and US Perspectives, in EU AND US 
ANTITRUST ARBITRATION 20 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds., 2011). 
125. Mourre, supra note 124, at 20. 
126. Arnold & Meindl, supra note 24, at 98. 
127. DELVOLVÉ ET AL., supra note 21, at 155. 
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smuggling, and terrorism, are “illicit virtually the world over.”128 Moreover, the concept of 
transnational public policy strays far from the plain language of the New York 
Convention.
129
 Article 2(b) states that a competent authority may refuse recognition or 
enforcement where granting recognition or enforcement “would be contrary to the public 
policy of that country,” not merely when it would be contrary to the public policies shared 
by a certain percentage of States party to the Convention.
130
 Under the transnational 
concept, the New York Convention’s public policy exception is redundant. A universally 
abhorred practice would be contrary to the public policy of every party to the New York 
Convention. Thus, the award-debtor would just as easily be able to set aside the award for 
public policy grounds in the State rendering the award as it would be able to challenge the 
award on those grounds in the State where enforcement is sought. 
3.1.4 What forms of public policy are relevant to international arbitrations?  
The ILA Final Report states that the public policy of a State relevant for purposes of 
Article V(2)(b) includes: 
(i) fundamental principles, pertaining to justice or morality, that the State 
wishes to protect even when it is not directly concerned;  
(ii) rules designed to serve the essential political, social or economic interests 
of the State, these being known as “lois de police” or “public policy rules”; and  
(iii) the duty of the State to respect its obligations towards other States or 
international organizations.
131
 
The first category, fundamental principles, can be divided into substantive and procedural 
fundamental principles. Substantive fundamental principles include, inter alia, the 
principles of good faith and pact sunta servanda, the prohibitions against abuse of rights, 
uncompensated expropriation, discrimination, and activities that are contra bonos mores, 
(e.g., piracy, terrorism, genocide, slavery, drug trafficking, and pedophilia).
132
 
Fundamental principles of a procedural nature include impartiality of the tribunal; equality 
                                                 
128. Sheppard, supra note 121, at 221 (citing Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Sept. 30, 
1994, European Gas  urbines SA v. Westman Int’l Ltd., 1994 REV. ARB. 359 (Fr.)). 
129. See BORN 2009, supra note 76, at 2837: 
The language and structure of Article V(2) cannot be reconciled with a requirement that 
Contracting States apply transnational or “truly international” public policy. As discussed 
above, Article V(2) permits non-recognition where giving effect to an award is “contrary to the 
public policy of that country,” that is, the country where recognition is sought. It is very 
difficult to interpret this formulation as a reference to purely international sources of law or 
public policy; had this result been intended, very different language would have been used. 
130. See New York Convention, supra note 32, art. V(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
131. ILA FINAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 6, recomm. 1(d). 
132. Id. at 6–7, ¶ 28. 
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of the parties; a reasonable opportunity to present one’s case; receipt of proper and 
adequate notice; adjudication free of fraud, corruption, or bias; respect for the res judicata 
effect of a foreign judgment or decree on an award; and rules of natural justice.
133
 Lois de 
police or public policy rules include such rules as antitrust laws, currency controls, price 
fixing rules, environmental protection laws, trade embargoes, tax laws, and consumer 
protection laws.
134
 International obligations include for example United Nations Security 
Counsel resolutions imposing sanctions.
135
 
Many aspects of public policy relevant to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
fall into more than one of the three categories listed by the ILA. Bribery and corruption, for 
example, are typically considered contra bonos mores, and their prohibition is a 
substantive fundamental principle. Anti-corruption measures may also be part of a State’s 
legislation and thus could additionally be considered lois de police. Moreover, a State may 
have an international obligation to other States to combat bribery and corruption under an 
international convention.
136
 
The ILA Final Report provides recommendations for how each category of public 
policy provisions should be dealt with by State courts in recognition and enforcement 
proceedings. With respect to fundamental principles, courts should determine whether the 
principle is “considered sufficiently fundamental” to justify refusing to recognize or 
enforce an award, taking into consideration the international nature of the dispute.
137
 
Where a party could have relied on a fundamental principle but failed to do so during 
arbitral proceedings, the ILA Final Report recommends that the party should be prevented 
from raising that principle in recognition or enforcement proceedings.
138
  
In respect of an award in violation of a State’s lois de police or public policy rules, 
the ILA Final Report suggests that its recognition or enforcement should not be refused 
unless the implicated rule was specifically intended to encompass the situation under 
consideration and recognition or enforcement would “manifestly disrupt the essential 
political, social or economic interests protected by the rule.”139  The ILA Final Report 
further stipulates that violation of such rule should be apparent on the face of the award 
                                                 
133. Id. at 7, ¶ 29. 
134. Id. at 7, ¶ 30. 
135. Id. at 7, ¶ 31. 
136. Id. at 7, ¶ 32. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 
I.L.M. 1. 
137. ILA FINAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 9, recomm. 2(b). 
138. Id. at 9, recomm. 2(c). 
139. Id. at 10, recomms. 3(a)–(b) (emphasis added). 
  
22 
and that courts should not undertake a reassessment of the facts.
140
 Where the rule at issue 
came into effect after the award was issued, courts should not refuse recognition or 
enforcement unless the legislator specifically anticipated such a result prior to the rule’s 
enactment.
141
  
Regarding international obligations, the ILA Final Report recommends that 
recognition or enforcement only be refused where recognition or enforcement would 
constitute a “manifest infringement by the forum State of its obligations towards other 
States or international organisations.”142 
Liebscher persuasively argues that the ILA’s tripartite categorization is unnecessarily 
complicated. He notes that the ILA Final Report’s inclusion of lois de police represents a 
minority view.
143
  he “essentiality” threshold applied to this category is lower than the 
“fundamentality” threshold applicable to fundamental principles.144 Moreover, the Report 
abandons the “fundamentality” threshold entirely with respect to international 
obligations.
145
 Liebscher argues that this stands in opposition to the “clear majority” view 
that all legal rules must be fundamental in order to be considered public policy.
146
 
3.2 What is public policy in the US? 
3.2.1 Public policy 
 he public policy of the US “at all times” restricts and limits the power of federal 
courts to enforce the terms of private agreements.
147
 In the US, public policy is a “rule of 
decision” that at all times overrides “a general rule of law,” including contract law.148 
Refusal to recognize an arbitral award because it violates the public policy of the US 
is rare, but when it does occur, it is usually because “the award conflicts with substantive, 
rather than procedural, US law or US policy.” 149  Public policy objections to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards based on procedural laws are generally unsuccessful in the 
                                                 
140. Id. at 11, recomm. 3(c). 
141. Id. at 11, recomm. 3(d). 
142. Id. at 11, recomm. 4. 
143. Christoph Liebscher, EU Member State Court Application of Eco Swiss: Review of the Case Law and 
Future Prospects, in EU AND US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION 807 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt eds., 
2011). 
144. Liebscher, supra note 143, at 807. 
145. Id. at 808. 
146. Id. 
147. Hurd, 334 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1948) (holding that enforcement of racially discriminatory restrictive 
covenants would be contrary to US public policy). 
148. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980). 
149. Levin & Price, supra note 57, at 1464. 
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US.
150
 Federal courts have held that an arbitral panel’s consideration of inconsistent 
testimony was improper and contrary to the policy of maintaining the integrity of the 
judiciary, but not at the level of being contrary to the public policy of the US.
151
 Nor was 
the failure to disclose a prior relationship to the enforcing party sufficient to rise to the 
level of being contrary to US public policy.
152
 The following discussion of public policy 
with respect to the US thus focuses on substantive US public policy. 
3.2.2 Arbitration and federalism in the US 
For much of US history, arbitration was governed by traditional rules of common 
law, the body of continuously evolving jurisprudence originating in the courts of 
England.
153
 Much of the jurisprudence used in applying the FAA steams from the common 
law. It is an understatement to say that the law governing arbitration in the US is 
complicated. One observer deemed it to be “a strange mixture of international agreements, 
federal legislation issued by the Congress, interpretative doctrines developed by the federal 
courts, and local laws and rules applicable in the individual state of the union involved.”154 
The US Constitution (“Constitution”) provides for a federal system of shared powers 
between the federal government and the several states (the “US states”). The Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution provides that a federal law that conflicts with a state law will 
trump, or “preempt,” that US state law.155 “[US] state laws that conflict with federal law 
are ‘without effect.’”156 This is particularly important for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign awards in the US because rules of public policy were traditionally and to a large 
extent still are viewed as the natural domain of the states, but international arbitration is 
ultimately under the purview of the federal government. 
Preemption of US state laws can be either express or implied. Express preemption 
occurs where a federal statute explicitly states Congress’s intent to preempt US state 
                                                 
150. Id. at 1465. 
151. Waterside Ocean Nav. Co. v. Int’l Nav. Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 151–53 (2d Cir. 1984). 
152. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 542, 545 (S.D. Ohio 1982). 
153. See Mark R. Joelson, The Interplay of International, Federal and State Law in US Arbitration, 24 J. 
INT’L ARB. 379 (2007). 
154. Joelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 379. 
155. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; 
and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in 
the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding (emphasis added). 
156. Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). 
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law.
157
 But even in the absence of explicit statutory language, US state law is impliedly 
preempted where it addresses a field that Congress intended the US government to 
exclusively occupy.
158
 US state law is also impliedly preempted “to the extent that it 
actually conflicts with federal law” or impedes the achievement of a federal objective.159 
Arbitration laws and rules of public policy applicable on the state level are 
commonplace in the US.
160
 Given that the FAA, a federal law, regulates the enforcement 
of all arbitral awards in the US, conflict between it and state arbitration laws is inevitable, 
giving rising to pre-emption questions.
161
 The solution to a pre-emption is guided by two 
touchstones: the purpose of Congress in enacting the relevant federal law and, where 
Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the States, the assumption that 
Congress did not intend for its legislation to supersede traditional State authority unless 
that was its “clear and manifest purpose.”162 
With respect to the FAA, the first test is easily satisfied: Congress’ “principal 
purpose” in enacting the FAA was to place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with 
other contracts and ensure that they are enforced according to their terms.
163
 The Supreme 
Court of the United States (“US Supreme Court” or the “Court”) has reiterated that the 
FAA established an “emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.” 164  That Congress 
intended the FAA to supersede state authority is equally apparent. Under the Commerce 
Clause of the US Constitution,
165
 the Congress has the “the power to regulate; that is, to 
                                                 
157. See, e.g., English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 
85, 95–98 (1983). 
158. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000); Freightliner Corp. v. 
Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995); English, 496 U.S. at 79. See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 
519, 525 (1977) (“Where . . . the field which Congress is said to have preempted includes areas traditionally 
occupied by the States, congressional intent to supersede state laws must be clear and manifest.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
159. English, 496 U.S. at 79. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–
43 (1963) (finding preemption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both US federal and 
US state laws); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (finding preemption where U.S. state law 
presents an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress”). 
160. See sources cited above, supra note 74. 
161. See George A. Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 42 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 175, 178 (2009) (discussing federal preemption issues related to the FAA). 
162. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Jones, 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
163. AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011); Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010); Buckeye, 
546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Volt, 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 
164. KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25, 181 L. Ed. 2d 323 (2011); see, e.g., Nitro-Lift Technologies, 
L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S.Ct. 500, 503 (2012); AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1745; Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 
346, 353 (2008); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985); 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Moses, 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
165. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (stating that Congress shall have power “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian  ribes”). 
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prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.” 166  By enacting the FAA, 
Congress was exercising its Commerce Clause power, implying “that the substantive rules 
of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts.”167 It is clear, then, that Congress 
intended for the FAA to supersede state rules of public policy. 
With respect to international arbitration, US public policy is thus quite confused. The 
FAA requires that recognition or enforcement of covered foreign awards only be refused 
where recognition or enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of the enforcing 
State. US states thus may hear actions to enforce but are required, in the case of foreign 
arbitral awards, to consider whether recognition or enforcement would be contrary to US 
public policy as opposed to state public policy. 
3.3 What is public policy in Europe? 
3.3.1 Public policy in the EU 
Just as in the US, each Member State of the EU has its own rules of public policy. As 
discussed regarding the UK, the Netherlands, and France, each Member State’s 
understanding of public policy plays a unique role in its respective national arbitration 
laws. Unlike in the US, there is no overarching federal, EU-level, law governing arbitration 
in the EU. However, there is an EU-level concept of public policy. In several recent 
decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has employed EU public 
policy in an arbitration context.
168
 
Yet, the contours of EU public policy remain undefined. One commentator posited 
EU public policy as being at the crossroads of the three aforementioned approaches to 
public policy: that of the enforcing State, international public policy, and transnational 
public policy.
169
 Because the first two approaches are nationally defined concepts—linked 
                                                 
166. Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. 1, 196, 2 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). 
167. Southland, 465 U.S. at 12; see also Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445; Moses, 460 U.S. at 1, 25, and n.32. The 
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(arguing that the FAA does not apply to proceedings in state courts); Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 
539 U.S. 444, 460 (2003) ( homas J., dissenting) (same); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 
689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); Allied–Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285–297 
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); Southland, 465 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (finding the 
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168. See, e.g., Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira, 2009 
E.C.R. I-9579; Case C-168/05, Elisa María Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL, 2006 E.C.R. I-
10437; Case C-127/97, Eco Swiss China  ime Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. I-3055.  
169. Olivier van der Haegen, European Public Policy in Commercial Arbitration: Bridge Over Troubled 
Water, 16 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 449, 459 (2009). 
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to a particular State, neither is adequate to explain EU public policy, in which “the state or 
national community as a basis is missing.”170 
If the position is taken that rules must meet a “fundamentality” threshold to be 
considered public policy,
171
 the lack of an EU-level definition of “fundamentality” 
becomes problematic.
172
 As Liebscher recommends, the CJEU “should deploy some efforts 
to develop a concept of fundamental EU rules.”173 It has to this point seemed satisfied to 
allow Member States to develop their own public policy, which may vary in scope from 
Member State to Member State.
174
 
3.3.2 Arbitration and federalism in the EU 
The EU constituted a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the 
Member States had permanently limited their sovereign rights.
175
 The CJEU has noted that 
EU law would lose its character as Community law if the domestic law of the Member 
States could override it.
176
 The legal basis of the EU itself would be called into question.
177
 
Bermann has noted that EU public policy stands to serves to ensure the primacy of EU law 
vis-à-vis the law of the Member States.
178 
EU law and international arbitration are self-contained, autonomous bodies of law. 
This is for three reasons: the historic separation of EU law and private international law; 
the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels Regulation;
179
 and the inability of arbitral 
tribunals to make preliminary references to the CJEU regarding the validity or meaning of 
EU law provisions.
180 
Initially, any harmonization in the field private international law was expected to 
occur not under the framework of EU law but through a separate convention entered into 
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by the Member States.
181
 Ten years after the entry into force of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community in 1958,
182
 the Member States entered into such a 
convention: the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Brussels Convention”).183 Authority for the 
Brussels Convention was derived from Article 293 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community.
184
 
However, in Marc Rich, the CJEU was called upon to determine the scope of the 
arbitration exception in Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels Convention, which states that the 
convention does not apply to arbitration agreements.
185
 The court held that while the New 
York Convention laid down rules that arbitrators must respect, it did not create obligations 
on the courts of the contracting States of the Brussels Convention.
186
 
3.3.3 Public Policy and arbitration in the EU 
The CJEU in Eco Swiss held that a Member State that treats an offence to domestic 
public policy as a ground for annulling a local award must treat offenses to EU public 
policy as a ground for annulment as well.
187
 While Member States have “procedural 
autonomy” to determine the means through which they and their courts implement and 
enforce European law, they are prohibited from discriminating against legal claims derived 
from EU law as compared to similar claims provided for in domestic law.
188
 Thus, if a 
Member State were to bar enforcement of an arbitral award on the grounds that it violated 
public policy, it must do the same when the award violates EU public policy.
189
 This 
dynamic can be compared to the federal-state relationship in US law. Whereas under the 
FAA, a US state must allow for enforcement of a the arbitral agreement or award that 
would be barred under state law, an EU Member State must bar the enforcement of an 
arbitral agreement or award that would otherwise be enforceable under Member State law. 
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Moreover, it is the CJEU alone that determines the content and scope of EU public 
policy.
190
 More will be said on that subject below. 
4 PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTIONS IN PRACTICE 
In Part 4, the practical application of provisions in the US and select EU Member 
States allowing for the refusal of recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards on grounds 
that recognition or enforcement would violate the public policy of State in which 
recognition or enforcement is sought is discussed in detail. France and the UK have been 
highlighted in order to draw a distinction between application of public policy exceptions 
in civil law and common law systems.  
Each State-specific section begins with a brief explanation of the practical 
application of public policy exceptions in the context of domestic arbitration in that State. 
4.1 Limited public policy exceptions to enforcement of arbitral awards under the 
Federal Arbitration Act exist in the US 
This section describes challenges to the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards 
on the grounds of public policy in the US. Subsection 4.1.1 briefly discusses the role of 
public policy in the application of the FAA to the recognition and enforcement of domestic 
arbitral awards. Subection 4.1.2 comprises the bulk of section 4.1, and it explains the 
application of the public policy exception under the FAA in the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. It considers in depth the most contentions areas of public policy relevant to 
enforcement proceedings.  
First, in paragraph 4.1.2.1, the issue of whether and to what extent US foreign policy 
can be equated to US public policy is explored. The seminal case Parson & Whittemore
191
 
is explained in detail, followed by a discussion of whether US public policy is implicated 
by anti-terrorism policies, trade embargoes, or sanctions. Second, in paragraph 4.1.2.2, 
whether a public policy challenge can be sustained on grounds that an arbitral agreement or 
award is contrary to federal or state law is examined. In that section, emphasis is given to 
agreements and awards alleged to be or actually contrary to the US Bankruptcy Act,
192
 the 
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Jones Act,
193
 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
194
 and the Sherman Act.
195
 Third, in 
paragraph 4.1.2.3, the effect that a foreign judgment or decree invalidating a foreign award 
or its underlying obligation has on enforcement in the US is considered. In this regard, the 
doctrine of comity employed in Sea Dragon is considered first.
196
 The extension of Sea 
Dragon to other policies and other alleged violations of foreign law is then analyzed. 
Fourth, in paragraph 4.1.2.4, public policy challenges on the ground that an agreement was 
entered into under duress are examined, focusing on the recent Changzhou decision.
197
 
Finally, in paragraph 4.1.2.5, public policy challenges to enforcement on the grounds that 
there was fraud by a party to the underlying agreement is explored. Consideration is given 
to two federal district court decisions: Indocomex
198
 and Trans Chemical.
199
 
4.1.1 Public policy exceptions to domestic arbitral awards under the FAA in the 
US 
While far from the norm, a not insignificant number of applications to vacate awards 
on public policy grounds have been successful in the US.
200
 Most likely to be refused 
enforcement are agreements or awards that violate lois de police or public policy rules. For 
example, domestic awards in favor of terminated workers were vacated on grounds of 
well-established public policies against the use of drugs or alcohol by employees engaged 
in high-risk occupations.
201
 Domestic awards are not the focus of this thesis, so it is 
sufficient to state only that public policy challenges have a low success rate in US courts. 
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4.1.2 Public policy exceptions to enforcement of international arbitral awards in 
the US under the FAA 
In the US, review of international arbitral awards is very limited. US courts are 
reluctant to allow defenses are not specifically listed in the Convention because title 9, 
section 207 of the US Code explicitly requires that a federal court “shall” confirm an 
award unless it finds one of listed grounds for refusal. But just as it is well settled that that 
domestic arbitral awards that are contrary to public policy will not be confirmed or 
recognized by US courts under the FAA, the same is true for international arbitral 
awards.
202
 For exceptions to enforcement of international arbitral awards, the FAA refers 
to “grounds for refusal . . . specified in the . . . Convention.”203  
US courts routinely address challenges under Article V(2)(b) by stating that there 
exists a strong US public policy in favor of international arbitration and its twin goals: 
settling disputes efficiently and avoiding lengthy and costly litigation.
204
 But US courts do 
consider challenges to the enforcement of or applications to set aside international awards 
on the basis that the award is contrary to US public policy. In defining public policy, US 
courts have turned to their jurisprudence regarding public policy challenges to domestic 
awards.
205
 
In general, the public policy exception is granted “only where enforcement would 
violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice”206—in other words, 
where a fundamental principle of the US would be violated.
207
 Case law has developed the 
notion of US public policy through numerous public policy challenges to awards subject to 
the New York Convention, including, as detailed below, challenges equating US foreign 
policy to US public policy; claims that an arbitral agreement or award is contrary to federal 
or state law; considerations of the effect of a foreign judgment or decree invaliding the 
award or underlying obligation; allegations the agreement was entered into under duress or 
fraud by party to the agreement; or that the award is barred by the doctrine of laches. 
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4.1.2.1 US foreign policy does not express the US’ “most basic notions of morality 
and justice” and cannot be considered US public policy 
US courts have been unwilling to equate the foreign policy of the US with “public 
policy” under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. Repeatedly, courts have 
stipulated that “‘public policy’ and ‘national policy’ are not synonymous,” even where 
enforcement of an arbitral award would allegedly benefit States with which the US has 
poor or no direct relations.
208
 
4.1.2.1.1 Parsons & Whittemore firmly established that US foreign policy is not 
equivalent to US public policy 
The Second Circuit
209
 decision in Parsons & Whittemore has become the benchmark 
test for balancing the US’ foreign policy interests with its interest in the uniform 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention.
210
 In that case, a 
US corporation, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. (“Parsons), sought to overturn a 
federal district court confirmation of an arbitral award in favor of Societe Generale de 
L’Industrie du Papier (“SG”), an Egyptian corporation.  
Parsons had agreed in November 1962 to construct and temporarily manage a 
paperboard mill in Alexandria, Egypt.
211
 The project was to be funded by the US State 
Department, through purchases of letters of credit from SG in Parsons’ favor. 212  The 
contract concluded between Parsons and SG included an arbitration clause. Work on the 
project continued as planned until May 1967. Facing “recurrent expressions of Egyptian 
hostility to Americans,” the majority of Parsons’ workforce left Egypt in anticipation of the 
Arab-Israeli Six Day War.
213
 On June 6, 1967, the Egyptian government broke diplomatic 
ties with the US and expelled all Americans from Egypt.
214
 Parsons abandoned work on 
                                                 
208. Ameropa AG v. Havi Ocean Co., No. 10 CIV.3240 TPG, 2011 WL 570130, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 
2011) (enforcing arbitral award despite conflict with US foreign policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran); 
see also Belship Nav., Inc. v. Sealift, Inc., No. 95cv2748, 1995 WL 447656, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1995) 
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the project, leading SG to invoke the contract’s arbitration clause. The arbitral tribunal 
concluded that the US State Department’s withdrawal of funding did not justify Parsons’ 
unilateral decision to abandon the project. It issued a final award in SG’s favor in March 
1973.
215
  
Parsons sought to avoid enforcement of the award in the US by invoking, inter alia, 
the public policy exception to enforcement under the New York Convention.
216
 Ultimately 
holding that the federal district court had properly rejected Parsons’ Article V(2)(b) 
defense, the Second Circuit provided what has become the authoritative analysis of foreign 
policy vis-à-vis public policy within the meaning of the New York Convention. The court 
reasoned that the Convention espoused a “general pro-enforcement bias,” most apparent in 
relation to the document it had superseded, the Geneva Convention of 1927.
217
 Whereas 
the burden of proof in enforcement proceedings was placed on the award-creditor under 
the Geneva Convention, the New York Convention had shifted the burden of proof to 
award-debtor. This change, the court reasoned, evidenced the basic effort of the New York 
Convention’s framers “to remove preexisting obstacles to [the] enforcement [of 
awards].” 218  The public policy defense should be read narrowly, the Second Circuit 
reasoned, in keeping with the Convention’s pro-enforcement bias.  
Moreover, the Second Circuit noted, “considerations of reciprocity” should persuade 
US courts to be circumspect in construing Article V(2)(b). Were US courts to read the 
defense liberally, foreign courts might follow suit, using the defense to prevent the 
enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in the US.
219
 The defense was properly construed 
to allow enforcing States to deny enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on the basis of 
public policy only where enforcement would violate the enforcing State’s “most basic 
notions of morality and justice.”220  
Parsons argued that the US State Department’s withdrawal of funding to the project 
required it to abandon the project. By removing its funding, the US State Department had 
indicated that the project was contrary to US foreign policy. Enforcing an award based on 
Parsons’ obligation to complete the project would thus contravene that foreign policy.  he 
court addressed Parsons’ argument dismissively: “In equating national policy with US 
                                                 
215. Id. 
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217. Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302. 
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public policy, [Parsons] quite plainly misses the mark.”221 The public policy defense was 
not meant to be used “as a parochial device protective of national political interests” or “to 
enshrine the vagaries of international politics under the rubric of ‘public policy.’” 222 
Foreign policy disputes with another State did not dislodge the Convention’s policy of 
providing predictable enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The court disallowed 
Parsons’ public policy defense, fearing that “deny[ing] enforcement . . . largely because of 
the United States’ falling out with Egypt . . . would mean converting a defense intended to 
be of narrow scope into a major loophole in the Convention’s mechanism for 
enforcement.”223 
4.1.2.1.2 Even US antiterrorism policy does not rise to the level of US public policy 
 he “most basic notions of morality and justice” test developed in Parsons was 
utilized in National Oil.
224
 Sun Oil, challenging confirmation of an award in favor of the 
Libyan government-owned oil company, argued that enforcement would penalize it for 
obeying and supporting US foreign policy and thereby deter other companies from 
cooperating with US sanctions programs; would be inconsistent with US antiterrorism 
policies; and would undermine internationally-supported antiterrorism policies by 
providing funds to Libya which could be used to support terrorist activities.
225
 To 
distinguish the facts from those in Parsons, Sun Oil argued that the Libyan government’s 
support of terrorist activities had been internationally condemned and could not be 
considered merely a “parochial” interest of the US.226 The District of Delaware was not 
persuaded: the US was not at war with Libya, and the executive branch had given Libya 
permission to bring the action. Under such circumstances, the court could not conclude that 
enforcement would violate the US’ “most basic notions of morality and justice.”227 
4.1.2.1.3 US trade embargoes and economic sanctions are not indicative of US public 
policy 
In Belship Navigation, the Southern District of New York considered whether the 
longstanding US foreign policy opposing the political regime in Cuba through the 
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imposition of a trade boycott was tantamount to an expression of US public policy.
228
 
While national economic policy prohibited dealings with Cuba, the public policy exception 
under the New York Convention did not encompass Washington’s embargo of Havana. 
Mideast politics and the boycott of Israel surfaced again in Antco Shipping, in which 
the petitioner claimed that opposition to the restrictive trade practices or boycotts imposed 
by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the US constituted US public 
policy.
229
 The Eastern District of New York relied on Parsons & Whittemore to decline a 
stay of arbitration on the grounds that arbitration would be contrary to US public policy. 
More recently in Karen Marine, US foreign policy opposing the Arab boycott was 
similarly held not to constitute US public policy for the purposes of refusing enforcement 
of an arbitral award.
230
 
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit upheld a foreign arbitral award in favor of the 
Iranian Ministry of Defense.
231
 The circuit court distinguished between the confirmation 
and the payment of an award. While the Iranian Transactions Regulations and the WMD 
Sanctions Regulations prohibited payment of an award without a specific license, neither 
regime prohibited confirmation of the award.
232
 The respondent had erred by equating US 
foreign policy with US public policy under the New York Convention.
233
 The circuit court 
affirmed the lower court’s confirmation of the award, holding that, even assuming the US 
had a fundamental public policy against economic support for the government of Iran, 
“confirmation would not violate that policy.”234 
4.1.2.2 International arbitration of claims under US federal law is usually permitted 
even where it would be disallowed as contrary to US public policy in domestic 
arbitration 
The difference in regimes applied by US courts to international arbitral awards than 
to domestic awards is most apparent when the dispute involves an arbitral award or 
agreement that would be contrary to federal or state law. Traditionally, claims arising 
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under federal law were considered not even arbitrable.
235
 However, in the benchmark 
Mitsubishi Motors, the US Supreme Court held that concerns of international comity, 
respect for foreign and transnational arbitral tribunals, and the need for predictability of 
disputes in international commerce required that it enforce an anticompetitive 
agreement.
236
 It did so “even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a 
domestic context.”237 It remarked that if “Congress intended the substantive protection 
afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial 
forum, that intention will be deducible from the text or legislative history.”238 
4.1.2.2.1 Foreign arbitral awards may be considered judgments pursuant to US 
bankruptcy law 
In Fotochrome, the Second Circuit sought to avoid determining whether the 
Bankruptcy Act constituted a “public policy” contrary to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention.
239
 The Second Circuit faced a question 
not contemplated by the FAA, the New York Convention, or the then current Bankruptcy 
Act: was a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention a “judgment” pursuant 
to the Bankruptcy Act, thereby evidencing provable debt, sufficient for a proof of claim in 
bankruptcy? The circuit court reasoned that although an award was not a judgment within 
the terms of the statute, it was nevertheless a binding adjudication on the merits. The 
Second Circuit held, however, that federal bankruptcy courts were not empowered to 
review arbitral awards: any challenge to the award had to occur in a federal district 
court.
240
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4.1.2.2.2 Agreements to arbitrate claims under the Jones Act will be enforced in US 
courts, but the enforcement of foreign awards resulting from the such 
arbitration may be refused if contrary to US public policy  
Maritime commerce in US waters and between US ports is federally regulated under 
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.
241
 Section 27 of the Act, eponymously referred to as the 
Jones Act after its sponsor Senator Wesley L. Jones, is specifically concerned with 
cabotage (i.e., coastal shipping of goods between US ports). Under the Jones Act, seamen 
are provided with rights not typically afforded under international maritime law. Seamen 
are allowed to bring actions against shipowners for damages based on claims of 
unseaworthiness or negligence.
242
 The Jones Act further entitles seamen to trial of their 
claims by jury—a right not afforded in maritime law absent express statutory provision.243 
The Jones Act was at the core of an interesting line of cases in the Eleventh 
Circuit.
244
 In Williams I, the Southern District of Florida held that a provision of a 
seaman’s employment contract and collective bargaining agreement requiring arbitration 
of his claims in the Bahamas under Bahamian law was not enforceable under the New 
York Convention on public policy grounds because Bahamian law compromised the 
seaman’s right to maintenance and cure under the Jones Act by not imposing a continuing 
duty on his employer to reimburse him for medical expenses due to injury.
245
 In Williams 
II, the Eleventh Circuit overturned Williams I, distinguishing between the New York 
Convention Article V(2)(b) policy public defense against the confirmation of a foreign 
arbitral award and the Article II defense against enforcement of an arbitration agreement. 
An agreement to submit disputes to arbitration must be enforced unless it is “null and 
void” as being “obtained through those limited situations, such as fraud, mistake, duress, 
and waiver, constituting standard breach-of-contract defenses that can be applied neutrally 
on an international scale.”246 Failure to provide rights under the Jones Act was not one of 
                                                 
241. P.L. 66-261, formerly 46 U.S.C. § 688, and codified on Oct. 6, 2006 as 46 U.S.C. § 30104 
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Ashley M. Wheelock, An Issue of Enforcement: Foreign Arbitration and Choice-of-Law Clauses Within a 
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those situations. Six weeks later, the Eleventh Circuit, acting sua sponte, withdrew and 
vacated its opinion, leaving the line of cases without precedential value.
247
 
The reasoning used by the court in Williams II remains instructive. The court 
employed the Bautista opinion to distinguish between Article II and Article V(2)(b) 
defenses.
248
 Article II is a defense to the enforcement of an arbitral agreement, whereas 
Article V(2)(b) is a defense to the enforcement of an arbitral award. In Bautista, the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision enforcing an arbitration agreement 
between a Filipino seaman and Norwegian Cruise Lines that prevented the seamen from 
bringing a claim under the Jones Act.
249
 The argument that enforcing an award that was 
contrary to the Jones Acts, an expression of US policy, may have been salient at the award 
enforcement stage but it could not be employed before arbitration proceedings took place. 
Attempts to prevent enforcement of arbitral agreements that were allegedly “null and void” 
because they were against public policy have been similarly rejected as “improper . . . 
under the [New York] Convention before arbitration.”250  
4.1.2.2.3 International arbitration of claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is 
permissible 
In Scherk, international arbitration of claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 was held to be permissible.
251
 Scherk was reinforced by Shearson, in which the US 
Supreme Court held that in order to defeat application of the FAA, a party opposing 
arbitration has to demonstrate that Congress intended to make an exception to the FAA for 
that particular claim. Because the party opposing arbitration of its claims under § 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act was unable to point to any intention of Congress “discernible 
from the text, history, or purposes of the statute,” the Court held the pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement was enforceable.
252
 Scherk is discussed further below. 
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4.1.2.2.4 International arbitration of claims under the Sherman Act is permissible, even 
where domestic arbitration would be impermissible  
Since the famous Mitsubishi Motors case, it has been settled law in the US that 
foreign arbitral awards are enforceable in the US even if, under domestic law, arbitration 
would be contrary to US policy public.
253
 
In Mitsubishi Motors, the US Supreme Court provided a definitive ruling as to 
whether a violation of US antitrust laws constituted a violation of US public policy 
sufficient to refuse enforcement under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.
254
 
Mitsubishi concerned the dispute between a Japanese automobile manufacturer, Mitsubishi 
Motors Corporation (“Mitsubishi”), and its distributor in Puerto Rico, Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. (“Soler). In 1979, Soler contracted with Mitsubishi and its parent company, 
Chrysler International, S.A. (“Chrysler”), for the sale of Mitsubishi-manufactured vehicles. 
The agreement provided that all disputes between Mitsubishi and Soler were to be settled 
by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration 
Association.
255
 Soler’s business was initially successful, and its minimum sales volume 
was significantly increased for the 1981 model year. However, the new-car market 
slackened, leaving Soler unable to meet the increased sales volume. It sought to ship some 
unsold vehicles to the US and Latin America, but Mitsubishi and its parent company 
refused permission for the shipments.
256
 Mitsubishi brought an action in the federal district 
court to compel arbitration under the agreement. Soler counterclaimed, asserting, inter 
alia, a cause of action under the Sherman Act.
257
 
In its Sherman Act counterclaim, Soler alleged that Mitsubishi and Chrysler had 
conspired to divide markets in restraint of trade by refusing to allow Soler to resell the 
vehicles it had obligated itself to purchase from Mitsubishi, refusing to provide parts which 
would allow Soler to make its vehicles suitable for resale outside Puerto Rico, and by 
attempting to replace Soler and its other Puerto Rico distributors with a wholly owned 
subsidiary.
258
 The US Supreme Court held that a breach of antitrust law and damages 
arising from the breach could be resolved in arbitration.
259
 Whereas the case law relied on 
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by Soler had found that “the pervasive public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, 
and the nature of the claims that arise in such cases, combine to make . . . antitrust claims . 
. . inappropriate for arbitration,” the Court reasoned that such precedent was only 
applicable to domestic transactions.
260
 With respect to international transactions, the Court 
held that “concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and 
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system 
for predictability in the resolution of disputes” required it to enforce agreements to 
arbitration, “even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic 
context.”261 
Thus, the US Supreme Court established a different standard for international 
transactions than for domestic transactions. In doing so, the Court followed Scherk, in 
which the Court enforced an arbitral award relating to the international transactions of 
securities, even while assuming for the purpose of the decision that the controversy would 
have been non-arbitrable had it arisen out of a domestic transaction.
262
 The Court noted 
that the US had a long established federal policy favoring arbitration and dictating that 
questions of arbitrability were to be resolved in favor of arbitration.
263
 The Court noted that 
there was no reason to depart from this established policy.
264
  
The US Supreme Court went on in Mitsubishi to note that there was no basis for 
assuming that arbitration of an antitrust dispute would be inadequate to or unfair in 
resolving an antitrust dispute.
265
 Nor did the Court consider the potential complexity of the 
dispute to be outside of an arbitral tribunal’s competence. The Court noted that 
“adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration.”266 In response to Soler’s 
argument that private enforcement of the Sherman Act was too integral to the US public 
policy in favor of free market competition to be left to the vagaries of arbitration, the Court 
reasoned that as long as a prospective litigant could effectively vindicate its statutory cause 
of action in arbitration, the Sherman Act would continue to serve its remedial and deterrent 
function.
267
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4.1.2.3 US courts have refused to enforce foreign arbitral awards where foreign 
judgments or decrees invalidate the award or its underlying obligation 
4.1.2.3.1 In Sea Dragon, the public policy exception was successfully invoked to 
prevent enforcement of an foreign arbitral award where enforcement was 
contrary to the US public policy favoring international comity 
Sea Dragon provides a rare example of a federal court refusing to enforce a foreign 
arbitral award on public policy grounds.
268
 The award-creditor, a Panamanian corporation, 
had contracted with the award-debtor, a Dutch corporation, for the shipment of cargoes of 
sugar. After shipment had been performed, a dispute arose over the non-payment of freight 
dues. Arbitration ensued. The award-debtor argued without success before the Southern 
District of New York that it was unable to pay the debt because doing so would violate a 
Dutch court’s sequestration order obtained by its creditor.269 The creditor, in accordance 
with Dutch law, had attached the debt owed from award-debtor to award-creditor. 
While the general rule favored the confirmation of foreign arbitral awards, the 
Southern District of New York held that the doctrine of comity did not permit it to confirm 
an award directing the award-debtor to violate Dutch law.
270
 The court reasoned that the 
decisions of a foreign court are to be accorded comity so long as that court is of competent 
jurisdiction and the laws and policy of the forum state are respected.
271
 Moreover, the court 
noted, it was “the firm and established policy of American courts to respect a valid foreign 
decree.”272  
Because the award-creditor had failed to demonstrate either that the Dutch court 
lacked jurisdiction or that the attachment order violated US law or policy, the Southern 
District of New York held that it had to give deference to the Dutch order. Otherwise, 
enforcement of the award would compel the award-debtor to violate Dutch law, and that 
would be an unacceptable result. Thus, the court held that the public policy exception 
applied, and it refused enforcement.
273
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4.1.2.3.2 Attempts to extend the Sea Dragon decision to other policies have been less 
successful 
In Sea Dragon, the Southern District of New York held that a foreign arbitration 
award may be refused enforcement under the New York Convention where the award 
compels conduct contrary to the US public policy favoring international comity. However, 
the Southern District of New York has declined to extend Sea Dragon in enforcement 
proceedings for foreign arbitral awards that allegedly compelled conduct contrary to other 
US public policies. 
In Golden Eagle, the award-debtor argued that enforcement of an award in 
petitioner’s favor would violate the laws and policy of the forum state—specifically, the 
US judicial doctrine of laches.
274
 While the doctrine plays a “central role” in the US 
judicial system, the Southern District of New York reasoned that it was far from the “level 
of public policy contemplated by the Convention.”275 The court held that an award must 
“compel[] the violation of law or conduct contrary to accepted public policy” for its 
enforcement to be refused under the public policy exception to the New York 
Convention.
276
 Whereas an award compelling the violation of a foreign court decree, as in 
Sea Dragon, “satisfies this standard[,] a misapplication of the equitable doctrine of laches 
does not.”277  
Whether an award can be refused enforcement because it compels conduct contrary 
to public policy was considered by the Ninth Circuit in Northrop Corp.
278
 The lower 
district court had refused enforcement of the award. It held that that the award compelled 
the respondent to pay commissions relating to the sale of weaponry to the Saudi Arabian 
government, in contravention of a US Department of Defense policy aimed at prohibiting 
such commissions. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It reasoned that in order for an award to 
refused enforcement because it compels conduct contrary to public policy, the public 
policy in question must be “well defined and dominant.”279 Because the Department of 
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Defense policy “arguably was neither,” the Ninth Circuit held that the lower court’s failure 
to enforce the award was unwarranted.
280
 
Golden Eagle and Northrop Corp. are indicative of the difficulty award-debtors have 
had in persuading federal courts to deny recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award on the grounds that a foreign judgment or decree invalidates the award or its 
underlying obligation.  
4.1.2.3.3 The doctrine of comity in Sea Dragon has not been widely adopted by other 
US courts 
In the Sea Dragon opinion, the Southern District of New York gave preference to the 
US public policy of international comity over the public policy favoring the enforcement 
of international arbitral awards. Most other US courts to reach the issue have come to the 
opposite conclusion.  
In Rintin, the Eleventh Circuit balanced the consideration of international comity 
with the public policy of the forum, Florida.
281
 The respondent in Rintin had been ordered 
to dismiss its ongoing foreign litigation in an arbitral award in the petitioner’s favor. While 
respect for international comity was Floridian public policy, another of the state’s public 
policies was “far more directly implicated”—that of “favoring the use of arbitration to 
resolve disputes arising out of international relationships.”282 The circuit court reasoned 
that dismissal of the suits was integral to the relief granted in the award and held that 
because the respondent had not demonstrated that the award offended “a basic principle of 
justice or morality,” the award would be enforced.283 
4.1.2.3.4 Attempts to extend the Sea Dragon decision to other alleged violations of 
foreign law have not succeeded 
The Sea Dragon holding has not been expanded to cover awards violating other US 
public policies, and it has also failed to find relevance in other cases where awards 
allegedly violating a foreign law were at issue.  
In American Construction, the Southern District of New York declined to refuse 
enforcement of an award despite a Pakistani judgment that the arbitration clause and 
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proceeding were void.
284
 Since the proceeding giving rise to the judgment had been 
“marked by . . . omissions and positive misstatement,” the court held that it would be 
against public policy for it to refuse enforcement of the award on the basis of the 
judgment.
285
 
The issue was revisited in Telenor.
286
 In Telenor, the respondent invoked Sea 
Dragon and argued that enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in the petitioner’s favor 
would be contrary to Ukrainian law just as enforcement of the Sea Dragon award would 
have contravened Dutch law.
287
 The court was not persuaded. It distinguished the award, 
which “though not required under Ukrainian law . . . , [was] not clearly prohibited,” from 
the award in Sea Dragon, which would have compelled action clearly prohibited by a 
Dutch decree.
288
 The court cast doubt on the notion that a public policy against 
enforcement of arbitral awards that compel a violation of foreign law even existed in New 
York.
289
 But even assuming that such a policy existed, it was “outweighed . . . by the 
public policy in favor of encouraging arbitration and enforcing arbitration awards.”290  
Ukrainian law was at issue again in Unrvneshprom.
291
 The respondent argued that 
the award in petitioner’s favor should be refused enforcement because it contravened 
Ukrainian law.
292
 However, the respondent failed to provide sufficient documentation in 
this regard.  he court held that, even assuming a “misapplication of Ukrainian law,” 
enforcement of the award would meet the standard set in Parsons & Whitmore—i.e., it 
would not amount to a violation of the US’ “most basic notions of morality and justice.”293  
4.1.2.4 US courts have refused to enforce foreign arbitral awards where the 
underlying agreement was entered into under duress 
Cases in which the arbitral award arises from an agreement allegedly entered into 
under duress are rare. When faced with other aspects of the public policy defense, many 
US courts have theorized that duress (whether the party seeking to avoid enforcement had 
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been subject to coercion or the arbitral agreement itself was the result of duress) would 
clearly be a situation in which enforcement of the award would violate public policy.
294
 In 
Changzhou, however, the Central District of California actually had to apply the duress 
branch of the public policy exception to the facts. 
In Changzhou, the Central District of California considered the award-creditor’s 
motion to confirm and enforce a foreign arbitral award against award-debtors Eastern 
Tools & Equipment, Inc. and Guoxing Fan under the New York Convention.
295
 The award-
debtors stipulated that Mr. Fan had been under duress when he signed an agreement with 
the award-creditor. At that time, Mr. Fan was held in police detention and “his fear of 
detention deprived him of his free will.”296 Enforcing the arbitral award arising from the 
agreement would be contrary to the public policy and law of the forum state, California, 
award-debtors argued. Pursuant to California law, contracts are voidable if made under 
duress or if a party’s assent was the result of the threat of duress.297 Upon review of the 
facts, the court held that it had been reasonable for Mr. Fan to believe that if he did not 
sign the agreement, he would be detained again until he signed.
298
 Aware that it was 
“unusual for a court to deny confirmation under Article V(2)(b),” the court reasoned that it 
would be “equally unusual” to enforce a contract “created without one party’s consent and 
complied with out of fear of imprisonment.”299 
Changzhou is a unique case in which an foreign arbitral award was refused 
enforcement under Article V(2)(b) because enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate 
entered into under duress would be contrary to public policy. However, the public policy at 
issue was that of California—and not necessarily that of the US. Were US public policy to 
coalesce around the view that the federal policy favoring arbitration outweighed the policy 
against enforcement of award entered into under duress, the California public policy 
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applied in this case would be pre-empted. Changzhou can be usefully compared to Rintin 
and Telenor, discussed above.
300
 In all three cases, the federal court seized of the matter 
applied the respective state public policy. However, only in Changzhou did the court find 
that state public policy constituted grounds to refuse enforcement of the award. In Rintin 
and Telenor, the courts held that the public policies of Florida and New York, respectively, 
favoring the resolution of disputes by arbitration outweighed the public policies offered by 
the award-debtors as grounds to refuse enforcement. 
4.1.2.5 US courts typically enforce foreign arbitral awards where the award or 
underlying agreement is alleged to be the product of fraud 
In Indocomex, the Western District of Tennessee confirmed a foreign arbitral award 
despite the award-debtor’s allegationsthat the underlying contract had been obtained by 
fraud.
301
 Specifically, the award-debtor asserted that the award-creditor committed fraud 
by failing to provide a letter of credit in a timely manner. The court was not persuaded. It 
reasoned that fraud, in respect to proceedings under the FAA, involved a showing of bad 
faith during the arbitration proceedings that had escaped the notice of the arbitrators. The 
award-debtor had not attempted to make such a showing, and the court enforced the 
award.
302
 The ruling in Indocomex is consistent with a line of cases in which enforcement 
of an arbitral award was challenged on the grounds that because the award was obtained 
through fraud by party to the agreement, its enforcement would be contrary to US public 
policy.
303
  
In Trans Chemical, the Southern District of Texas stipulated that a party alleging 
fraud must demonstrate that the behavior in question could not have been discovered by 
due diligence before or during the arbitration proceedings, was materially related to an 
issue in arbitration, and could be established by clear and convincing evidence.
304
 China 
National Machinery Import and Export Corp. (“CNMIEC”), the party seeking to avoid 
enforcement, alleged that as a result of  rans Chemical Ltd.’s (“ CL”) untimely 
production of a relevant report, TCL had fraudulently obtained the arbitration award. In the 
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months prior to the proceedings, TCL turned over 40,000 pages of relevant documentation 
to CNMIEC. However, the report was not among the produced documents, and CNMIEC 
specifically requested it on several occasions. Found “misfiled among . . . unrelated 
documents,” the report was finally turned over on the eve of the arbitration proceedings.305 
However, because CNMIEC had failed to offer any evidence—let alone “clear and 
convincing” evidence—that  CL’s conduct regarding the report was “fraudulent, immoral, 
illegal, or otherwise in bad faith,” the court dismissed CNMIEC’s claim.306 
Indocomex and Trans Chemical demonstrate the difficulty award-debtors have had in 
the US when seeking to have recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award 
refused on grounds that it or the underlying agreement was the product of fraud. 
4.1.3 US courts rarely refuse recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards on public policy grounds 
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, award-debtors have had little successful 
in utilizing the New York Convention’s Article V(2)(b) public policy exception. While 
enforcement was refused in Williams I, Sea Dragon and Changzhou on public policy 
grounds, these cases are at best marginal and are far outweighed by the majority of cases in 
which federal district courts recognize arbitration agreements and enforce foreign arbitral 
awards.  
4.2 Limited public policy exceptions to enforcement of arbitral awards under the 
Arbitration Act of 1996 exist in the UK 
The principle of finality is deeply entrenched in English law, and UK courts have 
traditionally been reluctant to refuse enforcement of a judgment or arbitral award on 
grounds of public policy.
307
 The limited public policy exceptions to the enforcement of 
domestic and foreign arbitral awards that do exist under the Arbitration Act of 1996 are 
discussed in this section.  
Subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 explore challenges on the grounds of public policy to 
domestic and foreign awards respectively. The venerable Soleimany v. Soleimany decision 
is used to exemplify the challenges to former, while challenges to the latter are more 
thoroughly detailed. In paragraph 4.2.2.1, the argument that because an arbitral agreement 
or award is contrary to English law, its recognition or enforcement should be refused by 
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UK courts is considered. In paragraph 4.2.2.2, the same argument in relation to agreements 
induced by fraud is discussed. Finally, in paragraph 4.2.2.3, the effect that a foreign 
judgment or decree invalidating a foreign arbitral award or the underlying obligation has 
on enforcement proceedings in UK courts is considered. 
4.2.1 UK courts refuse enforcement of domestic arbitral awards resulting from 
an agreement illegal under English law 
In Soleimany v. Soleimany, the defendant appealed a judgment enforcing a domestic 
arbitral award in favor of the plaintiff.
308
 The parties had been engaged in an enterprise to 
illegally smuggle carpets out of Iran and were in dispute over the division of profits. The 
arbitration took place before the Beth Din which applied Jewish law. The arbitrator had 
noted that the business activities were illicit under both Iranian and English law but 
attached no significance to this fact, as it had no effect on the parties’ rights under Jewish 
law.
309
  he Queen’s Bench Division overturned the lower court’s judgment holding that 
enforcement of a contract illegal under English law would be contrary to UK public policy. 
4.2.2 Public policy challenges to the enforcement of foreign awards under the 
EAA 
4.2.2.1 UK courts will also refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral awards resulting 
from an agreement illegal under English law, but are less likely to do so 
when the agreement is permissible under English law but illegal under 
foreign law 
While courts in the UK are generally reluctant to employ public policy to refuse the 
recognition or enforcement of foreign awards under section 103(3) of the EAA, they will 
do so where the award or underlying agreement is contrary to English law or “the 
requirements of substantial justice under English law.”310 However, the position of UK 
courts has considerably softened since Lord Denning declared: “An arbitrator has no 
jurisdiction or authority to award damages on an illegal contract. It is obvious that the court 
would not itself enforce such an award.”311 
English courts exhibit a pro-enforcement bias but will refuse enforcement where the 
underlying contract is illegal under English law. That position was established half a 
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century ago in David Taylor, in which the Court of Appeal refused to enforce an award 
based on a contract for the sale of Irish stewed steak at a higher price than that allowed 
under the English law.
312
 In that case, Lord Justice Denning remarked, “ here is one law 
for all. If a contract is illegal, then arbitrators must decline to award upon it just as the 
court would do.”313 Subsequent cases show the situation to be far more ambiguous. 
In Westacre Investments, the Court of Appeal held that a contract involving influence 
trading would only be contrary to UK domestic public policy if the contract was in 
violation of the domestic public policy of the State where it was to be performed.
314
 The 
parties, Westacre Investments Inc. (“Westacre” or the “award-creditor”) and Jugoimport-
SPDR Holding Co. Ltd. and Beogradska Banka (collectively, the “award-debtors”) had 
contracted under Swiss law for the sale of military equipment to Kuwait. When the arbitral 
award was decided in Westacre’s favor and the award-debtors’ move to have it set aside in 
Switzerland failed, the award-debtors sought to have it set aside in England.
315
  
The award-debtors sought to prevent enforcement of the Swiss award on grounds 
that it would be “contrary to public policy for recovery to be permitted in the English 
courts by any available route,” because the parties had mutually intended that the 
consultancy agreement be performed in a manner contrary to Kuwaiti law and public 
policy.
316
 Under the agreement, the award-creditors were to receive a 15 to 20 per cent 
commission on all sales of military equipment and related contracts for training and 
servicing. During the arbitration proceedings, a witness for the award-debtors testified that 
a commission of 15 to 20 per cent was “unusually high,” leading him to “draw the 
inference that it must have been appreciated by those involved in the making of the 
contract that some of the money at least would be applied to ‘illegitimate purposes.’”317 
For procedural reasons, the UK court had to take the facts alleged in the witness’ affidavit 
to be proven. The court focused on the primary issue of whether, if both parties intended to 
obtain the weapons contract through the exercise of personal influence over Kuwaiti 
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officials, including the payment of bribes, enforcement of the award rendered in 
Switzerland would be contrary to UK public policy.
318
 
The consulting agreement and arbitration clause were governed by Swiss law.
319
 The 
arbitrators unanimously decided the agreement was valid and that the award-debtors’ 
claims were governed by Swiss law which did not prohibit the type of consultancy 
agreement contemplated.
320
 The arbitrators held the agreement to not be invalid as contrary 
to bona mores.
321
 While the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense had issued a circular prohibiting 
the payment of consulting fees in relation to military contracts, the arbitrators held that the 
circular had not been established as part of the mandatory law of Kuwait. Nor, in the 
arbitrators’ opinion, did the agreement violate ordre public international as neither the 
lobbying by private enterprises to obtain public contracts nor agreements to carry out such 
activities were illegal per se.
322
 The essential test, which had to be applied on a case-by-
case base, the court reasoned, was “whether that which invalidates or renders void ab initio 
the underlying contract also strikes down or renders void the agreement to arbitrate.”323 
Judge Colman provided a detailed framework for analyzing the issue. First, where it 
is alleged that an underlying contract is illegal and void and that an arbitration award 
rendered from it is thereby unenforceable, the main question is whether the determination 
of the specific alleged illegality was within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. Second, Judge 
Colman reasoned, English law provided no general rule that an arbitration agreement 
ancillary to a contract illegal at common or statutory law cannot confer jurisdiction on 
arbitrators. Third, whether such an agreement could in fact confer jurisdiction on 
arbitrators depends on the nature of the illegality—where it is statutory illegality, the 
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relevant question is whether the illegality impeaches the agreement as well as the 
underlying contract; where it is illegality at common law, the question is whether public 
policy requires that disputes about the underlying contract not be resolved in arbitration. 
Fourth, when it is necessary at the enforcement stage for the court to determine whether the 
arbitrators had jurisdiction in respect of the disputes relating to the underlying contract, the 
court must consider the nature of the disputes in question. If the arbitrators had presided 
over a dispute in respect of a contract which was “indisputably illegal at common law,” an 
award in favor of the award-creditor would not be enforced by the court “for it would be 
contrary to public policy that the arbitrators . . . ignore palpable and indisputable 
illegality.” If, however, the issue before the arbitrators had been whether the underlying 
contract was illegal and void, the court would be required to consider whether enforcement 
of the award would be consistent with public policy were the illegality to be established, 
thereby impeaching the validity of the underlying contract.
324
 Fifth, if the court finds that 
the arbitration agreement confers jurisdiction on the arbitrators to determine whether the 
underlying contract was illegal, and the arbitrators determine that it was not, the court 
should prima facie enforce the award. Finally, if the award-debtor then seeks to challenge 
enforcement of the award on the basis of facts that were not known by the arbitrators but 
which render the underlying contract illegal, the enforcement court would have to consider 
whether the public policy against enforcing illegal contracts outweighed the public policy 
favoring the finality of awards in general and of awards of the same type in particular.
325
 
Applying the six-pronged approach to the facts, Judge Colman noted first that the 
Swiss arbitrators’ jurisdiction could be inferred from the parties’ acquiescence in the 
arbitration proceedings. The mutual intention of the parties to secure weapons contracts 
through bribery was plainly illegal under Kuwaiti law.
326
 Since enforcement was sought in 
the UK, Judge Colman then considered whether UK public policy would lead to a different 
result.
327
 He noted that it is “common ground that in English law a contract under which A 
promises to pay money to B if B will procure by bribery a public body to contract with A 
is illegal and void ab initio.”328 If B uses or intends to use bribery to secure the contract for 
A, B cannot enforce the contract with A, regardless of A’s intentions.329 
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Judge Colman reasoned that there was no doubt that the broad language of the 
arbitration clause included the issue whether the agreement was illegal and void, but 
whether the clause should be, as a matter of UK public policy, should be treated as 
enforceable depended on weighing the public policy against enforcement of corrupt 
transactions against the countervailing public policy of sustaining international arbitral 
agreements.
330
 Because the parties had chosen “an impressively competent international 
body,” the court could assume the arbitrators were competent to determine the issue of 
illegality.
331
 Thus, the risk that the arbitrators would come to an erroneous result was low, 
and the court reasoned that it could give predominant weight to the public policy sustaining 
the international arbitral agreements over the public policy of sustaining non-enforcement 
of contracts illegal at common law.
332
 
Since the award-debtor sought to introduce evidence not seen by the arbitrators, the 
court had to consider which the public policy against enforcement of corrupt contracts 
outweighed the public policy of finality of international arbitral awards—since what the 
award-debtor sought by means of the new evidence was essentially a “retrial.”333 The 
relevant question, Judge Colman reasoned, was “whether the public policy of discouraging 
corrupt trading represents a social policy to which effect ought to be given in the interests 
of international comity . . . in preference to the public policy of sustaining the finality of 
international arbitral awards.”334 He noted that “there is mounting international concern 
about the prevalence of corrupt trading practices.”335 International comity also had to be 
considered, but while direct enforcement of the contract “would clearly be offensive to 
comity,” enforcement of an award under the New York Convention would be “very much 
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less so.”336 Notwithstanding that “commercial corruption is deserving of strong judicial 
and governmental disapproval,” it was not so odious and requiring of “opprobrium” that 
the public policy opposing the enforcement of corrupt commercial contracts could be given 
precedence over the public policy favoring the finality of international arbitration 
awards.
337
 The award was enforced. 
4.2.2.2 UK courts may refuse recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award 
that is the product of fraud, but only where there has been reprehensible or 
unconscionable conduct 
UK courts recently discussed fraud in the procurement of a foreign arbitral award in 
the Naftogaz series of cases concerning a dispute between Gater Assets Limited (“Gater”) 
and NAK Naftogaz Ukraine (“Naftogaz”).338 AO Gazprom (“Gazprom”), a Russian state 
energy company, had contracted with a Ukrainian state energy company for the transport 
of natural gas from Russia across Ukraine to various European destinations. The contract 
included a clause providing for arbitration of disputes before the International Commercial 
Arbitration Court at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry (“ICAC”). 
After the Ukrainian energy company merged with other Ukrainian companies to form 
Naftogaz in 1998, Gazprom took out insurance against the risk of unauthorized 
withdrawals of natural gas by Naftogaz. The risk was reinsured by Monégasque de 
Réassurances s.a.m. (“Monde Re”).  he following year, a dispute arose over Naftogaz’s 
unauthorized withdrawal of gas. Gazprom sought and received reimbursement from its 
insurer, which in turn sought and received reimbursement from Monde Re. Monde Re 
commenced arbitration against Naftogaz before the ICAC in April 1999. In May 2000, the 
tribunal rendered an award in Monde Re’s favor. 339  
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Naftogaz attempted to have the award set aside in Russia but failed for lack of 
grounds on which a foreign arbitral award may be set aside.
340
 Monde Re was equally 
unsuccessful in its attempt to have the award enforced in the US.
341
 In 2006, Monde Re 
assigned the award to Gater, which sought enforcement in the UK. Naftogaz sought to 
prevent enforcement and argued that the award was unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy because, Naftogaz alleged, it had been procured by fraud. Naftogaz claimed that the 
complete text of the reinsurance agreement, which was purported to show that Monde Re 
undertook no risk, had been intentionally withheld from the tribunal. According to 
Naftogaz, the agreement was not an insurance contract but, in fact, “a structure allowing 
Gazprom to seek payment from former Eastern Bloc partners without any political 
implication.”342 Naftogaz alleged that Monde Re had given the arbitrators “an unsigned 
reinsurance contract in conventional terms whilst suppressing a document in the same 
terms which was signed only after the occurrence of the insured event and two addenda to 
the contract which completely changed its character.”343 
In Naftogaz I, the High Court granted an ex parte enforcement order which Naftogaz 
applied to have set aside. In Naftogaz II, the High Court was asked to order Gater to pay a 
security for Naftogaz’s costs.  he court reasoned that the allegations of fraud had to be 
considered. If Naftogaz’s allegations were true, the effect would be that “certainly as a 
matter of English law the transaction . . . is not a contract of insurance at all.”344 The High 
Court held that Naftogaz had succeeded in showing a prima facie case of fraud and ordered 
Gater to pay the requested security.
345
 
Gater appealed the Naftogaz II ruling, and the Court of Appeal reversed the High 
Court’s decision, holding that “the ordering of security for costs [. . .] was wrong in 
principle.” 346  Allowing an award-debtor to obtain security for costs to challenge the 
validity of an arbitral award on grounds of public policy would be “counter-intuitive,” the 
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court reasoned.
347
 In effect, the lower court had made enforcement of the award contingent 
on Gater’s payment of security. Under section 103 of the EAA, paralleling the text of the 
New York Convention, a UK court can refuse recognition or enforcement of an award 
“only if one of the exceptions within Article V is made good.” 348  Failure to provide 
security was not one of those exceptions. The Court of Appeal did not reach the question 
of whether the lower court had jurisdiction to order security, but rather held that 
notwithstanding the serious allegations of the fraud, there were not sufficient reasons in the 
case for it to do so.
349
  
Following its defeat in the Court of Appeal, Naftogaz sought to have the outstanding 
ex parte enforcement order set aside by the High Court in Naftogaz IV.
350
 However, Judge 
Tomlinson was less indulging than Judges Colman and Field had been in Naftogaz I and 
Naftogaz II. Judge  omlinson opined that “nothing short of reprehensible or 
unconscionable conduct will suffice to invest the court with discretion to consider denying 
to the award recognition or enforcement.”351 Because the Russian courts had concluded 
that there had been no intentional misleading of the arbitrators
352
 and Naftogaz could not 
show that “anyone . . . engaged in reprehensible or unconscionable conduct in an attempt 
to mislead the arbitral tribunal,” the High Court held that there was no basis upon which it 
could set aside the enforcement order.”353 In Naftogaz V, the Court of Appeal affirmed.354 
4.2.2.3 UK courts will refuse enforcement of an award invalidated by a foreign 
judgment only where recognition would be impeachable for fraud, contrary 
to natural justice, or contrary to public policy 
English courts have taken an approach similar to that employed by the Southern 
District of New York court in Sea Dragon when considering the effect of a foreign 
judgment invalidating an arbitral award. Such an award “should be enforced only if 
recognition of the order setting aside the order would be impeachable for fraud or as being 
contrary to natural justice, or otherwise contrary to public policy.”355 
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4.3 Application of French law regarding public policy exception to enforcement of 
awards 
Section 4.3 considers the application of public policy exceptions in France, a civil 
law country. First, in subsection 4.3.1, consideration is given to France’s unique 
differentiation of domestic and international public policy. As discussed below, both types 
of public policy are defined and understood from a French perspective. In subsections 4.3.2 
and 4.3.3, challenges to domestic and international arbitral awards, respectively, on 
grounds of substantive public policy are examined. Paragraph 4.3.3.1 considers whether 
illegality of the underlying agreement suffices for a challenge to the recognition or 
enforcement of an arbitral award in France. Finally, in paragraph 4.3.3.2, the effect that a 
foreign judgment or decree invalidating an arbitral award or the underlying obligation has 
on enforcement proceedings in French courts is considered. 
4.3.1 France uniquely differentiates between public policy and international 
public policy, employing the latter in challenges to the recognition or 
enforcement of foreign awards 
The understanding of public policy in France can be considered transnational. An 
arbitration agreement is held to be valid unless it is in conflict with fundamental principles 
of public policy.
356
The N.C.P.C., for example, allows awards to be set aside if the 
recognition or execution is contrary to international public policy. French law thus 
differentiates between domestic and international public policy, the latter concept 
embodying a stricter approach to public policy. 
Domestic public policy in France is comprised of rules in the public interest which 
parties may not disregard.
357
 Article 6 of the Civil Code provides: “On ne peut déroger, 
par des conventions particulières, aux lois qui intéressent l’ordre public et les bonnes 
moeurs (It is not permitted to derogate, by agreement, from laws which are matters of 
public policy or concern accepted standards of moral behavior).”358 The Code Civil does 
not define ordre public, and for the more than two hundred years Article 6 has been part of 
French law, courts have reinterpreted ordre public “in the light of changing social and 
economic conditions, attitudes, and ideas.” 359  Unlike the English and American 
interpretation of public policy as something apart from black letter law, French courts 
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consider lois (enacted laws) as a source of ordre public.
360
 Scholars have noted, however 
that “only the fundamental notions of the French . . . legal system[] can be regarded as 
belonging to public policy.”361 
“International public policy” is something of a misnomer in the French context. It 
would be more accurately labeled “French international public policy.” It does not 
designate the public policy of the international community, but rather the public policy of 
France in the world, consisting of French private international law rules applicable in 
international situations and in the French public interest.
362
 However, international public 
policy is not a mere addendum to ordre public but “an integral part of French law.” 363 
Rules of ordre public can be separated in three categories: protective public policy rules, 
which prohibit or require something in the interest of a particular class of persons or things; 
mandatory rules of law, which safeguard the social, economic, and political organization of 
France; and “fundamental principles of the universal justice,” which are accepted—if not 
necessarily respected—by most nations.364 International public policy falls within the third 
category. Thus, ordre public is a broader set of rules than international public policy, and 
not every breach of it will justify refusing to recognize or enforce a foreign arbitral 
award.
365
  
4.3.2 Application of French law regarding public policy exception to 
enforcement of awards in domestic arbitration 
To be enforceable in France, an arbitral award must be brought before a French 
national court. The juge de l’exequatur (the judge before whom the application for 
enforcement is sought) may issue l’exequatur (the order for enforcement) following the 
procedure provided in the New Code of Civil Procedure.
366
 Unlike the leave to enforce 
provided in the English Arbitration Act,
367
 the exequatur is an actionable judgment—i.e., 
the successful party can have it executed without further court process.  
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In domestic arbitration in France, every mandatory rule of French law, including 
enacted lois, is considered to be a rule of public policy. Arbitral tribunals must apply 
pertinent rules of public policy when adjudicating on the merits of a dispute.
368
 Where they 
have failed to do so properly and enforcement of a domestic arbitral award would be 
contrary to such a rule, an application for its annulment will be granted.
369
 
4.3.3 Application of French law regarding public policy exception to 
enforcement of awards in international arbitration 
4.3.3.1 Illegality of the underlying contract leads French court to refuse 
enforcement  
In European Gas Turbines, the Paris Court of Appeal made clear the position of 
French courts with respect to enforcement of arbitral awards where the underlying contract 
is illegal: “in general, French courts would reject any application to enforce or recognize in 
France an award which would give effect to, or encourage illegal deals in arms or drugs, 
criminal activity, religious or racial or sexual discrimination, or any violation of human 
rights.”370 French courts’ rejection can be compared to the logic employed by the English 
court in Soleimany v Soleimany. In that case, the court refused to enforce an award under 
Jewish law because the underlying obligation, while legal under Jewish law, was illegal 
under English law. French courts would similarly refuse to enforce an award where the 
underlying obligation conflicts with French law—if that rule of French public policy 
extends to international situations. In Lautour, the judge reasoned that French ordre public 
would be infringed if the application of a foreign rule conflicts with “principles of 
universal justice which French public opinion considers as having absolute international 
value.”371 While the language was more grandiose than that used by the English lord, the 
result is the same: even if the underlying contract is permissible under the law governing 
the agreement, enforcement will be refused if the underlying contract is illegal under the 
rules of the enforcing State.  
However, whilst every rule of international public policy is a rule of ordre public, the 
reverse is not necessarily true.
372
 Some rules of ordre public are not applicable 
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internationally. For example, “gold clauses”—contractual provisions intended to limit the 
effects of currency depreciation—are barred in domestic French contracts because they are 
considered contrary to ordre public. In international transactions, however, “gold clauses” 
are permissible because their prohibition is not considered a principle of universal justice 
having absolute international value.
373
 
Even where a rule of public policy is considered international public policy, French 
courts apply it narrowly, as exemplified by the Paris Court of Appeals in Thal s v. 
Euromissile.
374
 The arbitral award at issue in Thal s ordered  hal s to pay damages to 
Euromissile over a licensing dispute. Neither party alleged an incompatibility of the 
agreement with EU law, and the arbitrators had not brought it up on their own. However, 
 hal s filed a request for vacatur before the court, arguing that the underlying agreement 
was in breach of EU competition law, thereby placing the resulting award in violation of 
international public policy.
375
 The court referred to the Eco Swiss judgment and confirmed 
that Article 101 TFEU constituted international public policy.
376
 The court further reasoned 
that a violation of Article 101 TFEU could result in an award being successfully vacated or 
refused recognition or enforcement. The court noted, however, that the CJEU had 
recognized the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States. The court 
concluded that French procedural law could thus be applied. It noted that despite the 
parties having failed to raise the issue during the arbitral proceedings, a court could still 
exercise control because respect for mandatory rules of EU law “should not be conditioned 
by the attitude of the parties.” However, the court held that a “judge cannot . . . in the 
absence of fraud . . . carry out an examination of the application of competition law to the 
disputed contract.” Commentators have remarked that Thal s “clarifies the Eco Swiss 
decision” by stating that an award cannot be invalidated because the arbitral tribunal failed 
to raise potential violations of EU competition law.
377
 
Other French courts have come to similar conclusions. In Société SNF SAS v. Société 
Cytec Industrie, the Paris Court of Appeals considered the effect on the award of an 
                                                 
373. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] May 17, 1927, Pélissier du Besset 
v. The Algiers Land and Warehouse Co., D.P. I, at 25 (Fr.); see also DELVOLVÉ ET AL., supra note 21, at 5, 
153–54; POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 95, at 31. 
374. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Nov. 18, 2004, SA  hal s Air Défense v. 
GIE Euromissile, 2005 REV. ARB. 751 (Fr.). 
375. See Liebscher, supra note 143, at 792. 
376. TEC, supra note 184, art. 81 (as in effect 1999) (now TFEU, supra note 184, art. 101). Article 101 
 FEU prohibits “all agreements and concerted practices which may affect trade between [EU] Member 
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the common market.” 
377. Liebscher, supra note 143, at 793. 
  
59 
alleged violation of EU competition law that had been argued before the arbitral 
tribunal.
378
 The court held that it could not substitute its view for that of the tribunal “in the 
absence of flagrant, real and concrete violation of international public policy.” Its decision 
was affirmed by the Cour de Cassation.
379
 
4.3.3.2 French courts will enforce an arbitral agreement or award invalidated by a 
foreign judgment or decree because France, uniquely, does not extend 
judicial comity to foreign judgment concerning arbitral awards 
Whereas in Sea Dragon, a court in the US employed the US public policy in favor of 
judicial comity to refuse the enforcement of an arbitral award ordering the violation of 
Dutch law, French courts do not extend judicial comity to foreign judgments concerning 
arbitral awards.
380
 France’s approach is unique and has been criticized as creating a lack of 
uniformity in the application of the New York Convention.
381
 The approach is rooted in the 
notion than an international arbitral award has legal force independent of the authority of 
the courts at the place of arbitration or of those under whose law it was rendered. From this 
perspective, an international arbitral award is a binding decision on the parties, made by a 
private tribunal empowered by the parties to affect their rights and obligations; it is the 
result of an agreement between private parties, not the product of “a judicial organ of any 
state.”382 Because the parties chose arbitration over litigation, they—at least impliedly—
agreed to exclude the national courts of the place of arbitration from the resolution of the 
dispute. Thus, the parties intended that the courts would not be able to make a declaration 
as to the award’s validity that would be binding in the courts of other countries.383  
France’s approach reflects the concern that a party seeking to avoid enforcement 
would be unfairly advantaged if were able to prevent the enforcement of the award in 
every country simply because the award had been invalidated in the courts of its origin.
384
 
While courts at the origin of the award have the authority under the New York Convention 
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to set aside the award under their national laws, in the French understanding, they do not 
have the ability to give that decision “extra-territorial effect.”385 
5 TRENDS IN THE US AND THE EU 
In the US, the Federal Arbitration Act has limited the ability of US states to use 
public policy rules to regulate or prevent arbitration of particular issues. The US Supreme 
Court recently held that a California consumer protection law prohibiting class action 
arbitration waivers was preempted by the FAA.
386
 Similarly, the US Supreme Court has 
held that disputes implicating antitrust law can be decided in international arbitration. In 
Europe, the movement to unify laws amongst the Member States has gone in the opposite 
direction. European regulations and directives on consumer protection and competition law 
have worked to prevent arbitration of issues that could be arbitrated under the Member 
States’ domestic law. Thus, whereas in US, the expansion of federal legislation liberalizes 
arbitration; in the EU, the expansion of "federal" legislation has limited its scope. It is 
paradoxical that federal law in US that is largely been unchanged since 1925 allows for 
more liberal policy towards arbitration than that of the regulations and directives of the 
EU. 
In the EU, public policy has been increasingly relied upon where EU law intersected 
with commercial arbitration.
387
 Two particularly well-known areas in which EU public 
policy has had an effect on arbitration are antitrust (competition) law and consumer law. 
Part 5 discusses the approaches to these areas from US and EU perspectives. In section 5.1, 
antitrust law is considered, and, in section 5.2, the focus shifts to consumer law—consumer 
contracts in particular. 
5.1 The permissive attitude toward arbitration of antitrust disputes in the US can 
be contrasted with the restricted possibility for disputes involving competition 
law to be decided in arbitration in the EU 
The permissive attitude toward arbitration of antitrust disputes, as exemplified by the 
US Supreme Court’s decisions in Mitsubishi Motors and Baxter, is considered in 
subsection 5.1.1. It is contrasted, in subsection 5.1.2, with the approach in the EU that 
views mandatory provisions of EU competition law as a part of EU public policy that 
cannot be entrusted solely to arbitrators. 
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5.1.1 Permissive attitude to arbitration of antitrust disputes in the US 
The US Supreme Court allowed for the arbitrability of antitrust disputes in 
Mitsubishi Motors, making a sharp departure from the judicial distrust of arbitration of 
antitrust disputes exemplified by American Safety.
388
 The Court declined to address 
American Safety’s continued applicability in domestic arbitrations, but forthrightly denied 
its relevance in international disputes.
389
  
Blanke & Landolt argue that the US Supreme Court’s endorsement of arbitrability in 
Mitsubishi was based on the legal order’s trust in arbitrators, rather than on the ability of 
courts to verify that the arbitrators have properly applied antitrust laws.
390
 Indeed, over 
time, the Mitsubishi Motors decision has been repeatedly enforced in the lower courts and 
extended to include domestic arbitrations. 
In Gemco¸ the Southern District of New York opined that the “foundations of the 
American Safety doctrine [had] been significantly eroded” and predicted it eventual 
demise.
391
 Several years later, the court stated that “the reasoning of Mitsubishi should 
apply with equal force to domestic claims.” 392  American Safety was then explicitly 
overruled at the federal appellate level by the Ninth Circuit in 1994. In Ngheim, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that it was persuaded that Mitsubishi Motors was not restricted to the 
international context because the US Supreme Court had subsequently cited Mitsubishi 
Motors for the general proposition that antitrust claims could be arbitrated in Gilmer; 
specifically refuted the American Safety analysis in Mitsubishi Motors; and dismissed as 
unfounded the theory supporting the American Safety doctrine that the private cause of 
action is fundamental to enforcing antitrust laws.
393
 
The recent Baxter case presents a striking example of how far the federal courts are 
willing to go in favor of the arbitration of antitrust disputes. Baxter involved a dispute 
between Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) and Baxter International (“Baxter”), a 
pharmaceutical company. In the 1960s, Baxter invented sevoflurane, an anesthetic gas.
394
 
At the time, Baxter was unable to commercially exploit sevoflurane, and it was not until 
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the 1980s that Baxter developed a cost-effective production process, for which it received 
two process patents. However, because it was unwilling to bear the costs of required 
medical testing in the US, Baxter granted an exclusive worldwide license to the 
sevoflurane process patents to Maruishi Pharmaceutical Company of Japan (“Maruishi”). 
Sevoflurane proved to be very profitable for Maruishi, inspiring many other companies to 
attempt to develop alternative production methods that would not impinge on the process 
patents. One such company was successful and, after obtaining a process patent for its new 
development method, it was acquired by Baxter in 1998. Baxter had concluded that it 
would make more selling sevoflurane manufactured via the new process than it would lose 
in royalties on reduced sales of the Maruishi sevoflurane. 
Abbott, the reseller of Maruishi sevoflurane in the US, was chagrined at the prospect 
of competition in the US market before the expiry of the original process patents. It 
initiated arbitration proceedings under the Baxter-Maruishi agreement, to which it had 
become a party in 1992, and the New York Convention.
395
 Abbott argued that Baxter’s sale 
of sevoflurane manufactured via the new process would violate the exclusivity term of the 
Maruishi license. Baxter responded that the license prevented it from issuing any further 
licenses but did not expressly prohibit it from competing with Maruishi. Baxter further 
argued that if the license did forbid it from competing, it was in violation of section 1 of 
the Sherman Act and thus unenforceable.
396
 The three-member arbitral tribunal sided with 
Abbott on both issues. It held that the exclusivity term prevented Baxter from competing 
with Maruishi and that Baxter was responsible for any reduction in competition attributable 
to its acquisition of a company manufacturing sevoflurane through a new process.
397
  
Abbott sought to enforce and Baxter sought to prevent the enforcement of the award 
in the Northern District of Illinois. The district judge ordered Baxter to comply with the 
award, rejecting Baxter’s argument that the license violated the Sherman Act and was 
unenforceable.
398
 Baxter appealed the Northern District of Illinois’ decision before the 
Seventh Circuit, arguing that construing the license to keep sevoflurane manufactured 
through the new process off the US market was a territorial allocation unlawful under the 
Sherman Act.  he Seventh Circuit rejected even the assumption underlying Baxter’s 
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argument: that Baxter was entitled to reargue an issue decided by the arbitral tribunal.
399
 It 
reasoned that section 207 of the FAA required a court to confirm a foreign award unless it 
finds one of the grounds for refusal of recognition or enforcement expressly provided in 
the Convention. Because those grounds did not include mistake of law, the Seventh Circuit 
held that it had to confirm the award.
400
 
In the Baxter decision, the Seventh Circuit opined on the practice of arbitrators 
deciding antitrust disputes. It noted, “[a]rbitrators regularly handle claims under federal 
statutes,” and rejected the notion that “things should be otherwise for antitrust issues.”401 
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the US Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors found the 
international arbitration of antitrust disputes to be appropriate and that rearguing the 
antitrust issue, as Baxter proposed, “would subvert the promises the United States made by 
acceding to the [New York] Convention.”402 
5.1.2 Restricted ability to arbitrate disputes involving European competition 
law 
It is often proposed that the principles of European competition law are the most 
cogent expression of European public policy.
403
 Lending considerable weight to this claim 
is the CJEU’s judgment in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV.404  
In Eco Swiss, questions referred to CJEU were raised in proceedings brought by 
Benetton International NV (“Benetton”) for stay of enforcement of an arbitration award 
ordering it to pay damages to Eco Swiss China Time Ltd (“Eco Swiss”) for breach of a 
licensing agreement concluded with the latter, on the ground that the award in question 
was contrary to public policy within the meaning of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure by 
virtue of the nullity of the licensing agreement under Article 101 TFEU.
405 
Benetton, a Dutch company, signed an eight-year licensing agreement with Eco 
Swiss, a Hong Kong company, and Bulova Watch Company, an American corporation.
406
 
                                                 
399. Baxter, 315 F.3d at 831. 
400. Id. (citing George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
401. Id. at 831–32. 
402. Id. at 832. 
403. Bermann 2012, supra note 178, at 411; Liebscher, supra note 143, at 790. 
404. Eco Swiss, 1999 E.C.R. I-3055 (1999). See also Joined Cases C-295, C-296, C-297 & C-298/04, 
Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Antonio Cannito v. Fondiaria Sai SpA, and 
Nicolò Tricarico, Pasqualina Murgolo v. Assitalia SpA, 2006 E.C.R. I-6619, ¶ 31 (“Articles [101 and 102 
 FEU] are a matter of public policy which must be automatically applied by national courts.”). 
405. Eco Swiss, 1999 E.C.R. I-3055, ¶ 2. At the time of the Eco Swiss decision, TFEU, supra note 184, art. 
101 was in effect as TEC, supra note 184, art. 81. For sake of clarity, Article 101 TFEU is referred to in the 
text. 
406. Eco Swiss, 1999 E.C.R. I-3055, ¶ 9. 
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 he agreement granted Eco Swiss the right to manufacture watches bearing the “Benetton 
by Bulova” label, to be sold by Eco Swiss and Bulova.407 The agreement provided that all 
disputes arising between Benetton, Eco Swiss, and Bulova were to be settled by arbitration 
according to the rules of the Nederlands Arbitrage Instituut and under Dutch law.
408
 
Benetton terminated the agreement after only five years, giving rise to arbitral proceedings 
between the parties.
409 
After being ordered to compensate Eco Swiss and Bulova for damages they had 
suffered as a result of the early termination, Benetton applied for annulment of the award 
on that ground that it was contrary to public policy by virtue of the nullity of the licensing 
agreement under Article 101 TFEU.
410
 At no point in the arbitral proceedings had Benetton 
raised the question whether the licensing agreement was void under Article 101 TFEU.
411
 
When its application for a stay was denied by the Rechtbank, Benetton appealed to the 
Gerechtshof, which proved more sympathetic, ruling that the final arbitration award could 
be held contrary to public policy and thus granting the application for a stay.
412
 Eco Swiss 
countered with proceedings in cassation before the Hoge Raad.
413
 The Hoge Raad noted 
that an arbitration award is contrary to public policy under Dutch law only if its 
enforcement would violate a “mandatory rule so fundamental that no restrictions of a 
procedural nature should prevent its application.”414  he “mere fact that, because of the 
terms or enforcement of an arbitration award, a prohibition laid down in competition law is 
not applied is not generally regarded as being contrary to public policy.”415 The Hoge Raad 
reasoned that neither party had raised the Article 101 TFEU issue during the arbitration 
proceedings and that the arbitrators would have been exceeding their authority, opening 
their award to possible annulment, had they brought it up on their own.
416
 However, it 
referred a number of questions to the CJEU for preliminary rulings, including, inter alia, 
whether a court must set aside an award that it considers contrary to Article 101 TFEU 
notwithstanding limits imposed by Member State procedural law.
417
 
                                                 
407. Id. 
408. Id. ¶ 10. 
409. Id. ¶ 11. 
410. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. 
411. Id. ¶ 26. 
412. Id. ¶¶ 17–22. 
413. Id. ¶ 23. 
414. Id. ¶ 24. 
415. Id. ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 
416. Id. ¶ 26. 
417. Id. ¶ 30. 
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The CJEU addressed the reference by reiterating its position in Nordsee that an 
arbitration tribunal is not a “court or tribunal of a Member State” within the meaning of 
Article 267 TFEU and is therefore not able to refer questions to the CJEU.
418
 The court 
stated that, in the interest of efficient arbitration proceedings, review of arbitration awards 
should be limited and refusal to recognize or enforce award should be occur only in 
exceptional circumstances.
419
  
Those concerns, however, were trumped by the fact that Article 101 TFEU 
represented “a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the task 
entrusted to the [EU] and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market.”420 
Because arbitrators are not able to refer questions of law to the CJEU, it is in the interest of 
the EU that questions concerning Article 101 TFEU be examined by Member State courts 
and referred to the CJEU where necessary.
421
  
The CJEU noted that the purposes of Article 101 TFEU were so vital to the European 
project that it led the framers of the Treaty to provide expressly in Article 101(2) TFEU 
that any agreements prohibited pursuant to it would be “automatically void.”422 Article 101 
TFEU, the court reasoned, could be regarded as a matter of public policy under Article 
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.
423
 The court held that where the procedural law of a 
Member State required a court to grant an application for annulment on grounds that the 
award violated national public policy, the Member State was required to also grant an 
application on grounds that the award failed to comply with Article 101(1) TFEU.
424
 
Clearly a disparity exists between arbitration of disputes involving antitrust 
(competition) laws in the US as in the EU. Scholars, however, have noted that arbitration 
poses no threat to the enforcement of EU competition policy, just the US Supreme Court 
found arbitration not to endanger the enforcement of US antitrust laws.
425
 In the following 
section, the treatment of consumer protection laws in the US and the EU in respect of 
arbitration is discussed. 
                                                 
418. Id. ¶ 34 (citing Case C-102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v Reederei 
Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co KG, 1982 E.C.R. 1095, ¶¶ 10–12)). At the time of the Eco Swiss 
decision, TFEU, supra note 184, art. 267 was in effect as TEC, supra note 184, art. 234. For sake of clarity, 
Article 267 TFEU is referred to in the text. 
419. Eco Swiss, 1999 E.C.R. I-3055, ¶ 35. 
420. Id. ¶ 36. 
421. Id. ¶ 40. 
422. Id. ¶ 36. 
423. Id. ¶ 39. 
424. Id. ¶¶ 37, 41. 
425. Brozolo, supra note 1, at 782. 
  
66 
5.2 Whereas US state consumer law does not stand in the way of US federal policy 
favoring arbitration, EU consumer law does stand in the way of Member State 
rules compelling such arbitration 
Scholars have noted that the arbitration of disputes involving consumer contracts 
presents “a very special problem.”426 Consumer contracts often arise from the day-to-day 
transactions of consumers, and, if in writing, are usually standard form contracts, or, in 
more pejorative terms, contracts of adhesion.
427
 Such contracts tend to be “extremely one-
sided,” favoring sellers and suppliers against consumers. 428  Whether from manifest 
weakness in bargaining position, ignorance, or indifference, consumers regularly enter into 
lopsided contracts of adhesion.
429
 These contracts are rarely negotiated and may not be 
fully understood by the consumers agreeing to their terms.
430
 A consumer’s only 
alternative to “complete adherence” to contract of adhesion is often limited to “outright 
rejection.”431 The insertion of an arbitration clause into a lengthy consumer contract can 
effectively limit a consumer’s avenues of relief under the contract.  
Whereas a liberal approach to arbitration of consumer contracts has recently 
dominated in the US, the opposite tact has gained prevalence in the EU. The current 
jurisprudence of the US is discussed below in subsection 5.2.1, followed by an explanation 
of the situation in Europe in subsection 5.2.2. 
5.2.1 US state public policy expressed in consumer protection laws prohibiting 
mandatory arbitration of consumer contracts is preempted by the federal 
policy favoring arbitration of contractual disputes 
In paragraph 5.2.1.1, the former treatment of arbitration of contracts of adhesion 
under California law is explained. AT&T Mobility, in which the US Supreme Court held 
California’s approach to be pre-empted under the FAA, is discussed in paragraph 5.2.1.2. 
5.2.1.1 Pre-empted California State approach 
In the Discover Bank decision, the Supreme Court of California held that the 
mandatory waiver of class arbitration in consumer contracts of adhesion is unconscionable 
                                                 
426. Otto & Elwan, supra note 303, at 360. 
427. A contract of adhesion or adhesion contract is a “standard form contract prepared by one party, to be 
signed by another party in a weaker position, usually a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little 
choice about the terms.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 366 (9th ed. 2011). 
428. QUINTIN JOHNSTONE & DAN HOPSON JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 329–30 (1967). 
429. JOHNSTONE & HOPSON JR., supra note 428, at 360. 
430. Otto & Elwan, supra note 303, at 360. 
431. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 297 (3d ed. 1999). 
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under certain circumstances and should not be enforced by California courts.
432
 Moreover, 
the court asserted that the FAA did not preempt the prohibition of class action waivers in 
arbitration agreements.
433 
At issue in Discover Bank was the validity of a provision in an arbitration agreement 
between Discover Bank and Christopher Boehr, a California resident and credit cardholder, 
forbidding class arbitration of disputes.
434
 Boehr alleged that Discover Bank engaged in a 
deceptive practice by representing to cardholders that late payment fees were not assessed 
if payment was received by a particular date, whereas in fact such fees were assessed if 
payment was received after 1:00 p.m. on that date.
435
 Discover Bank’s practice thus “l[ed] 
to damages that were small as to individual consumers but large in the aggregate.”436 
Boehr claimed for damages and Discover Bank moved to compel arbitration pursuant to 
the arbitration agreement.
437
 Boehr then sought to decide the dispute in a class-wide 
arbitration, a “well accepted” practice in California.438  
The arbitration agreement concluded between the parties however contained a clause 
forbidding class-wide arbitration of disputes.
439
 It further stated that Delaware law and the 
FAA governed the agreement.
440
 Discover Bank argued that section 2 of the FAA requires 
the enforcement of the arbitration clause, including class action waivers.
441
 The dispute 
took a circuitous route through the California courts before ultimately arriving at the 
Supreme Court of California.
442 
                                                 
432. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 94 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
433. Id. 
434. Id. at 80. 
435. Id. 
436. Id. at 78. 
437. Id. at 81. 
438. Id. at 78. 
439.  he clause stated that “neither you nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate claims in arbitration 
by or against other card members with respect to other accounts, or arbitrate any claim as a representative or 
member of a class or in a private attorney general capacity.” Id. at 79. 
440. Id. at 79–80. 
441. Id. at 80. 
442. Initially the trial court sided with Discover Bank and granted its motion to compel arbitration, under 
Delaware law. Id. at 81. Shortly thereafter, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of California decided that a 
“virtually identical class action waiver was unconscionable” in Szetela. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Boehr sought and was granted reconsideration of his claim in light of 
the Szetela decision. Discover Bank, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 81. The trial court found Szetela to constitute new 
and controlling authority and held that enforcing the class action waiver under Delaware law would 
contravene a fundamental Californian public policy. Id. Discover Bank appealed, seeking reinstatement of 
the trial court’s prior order to compel arbitration.  he appellate court was sympathetic, holding that the FAA 
preempted any state law rule prohibiting class action waivers. Id. The Supreme Court of California granted 
review. Id. 
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The Supreme Court of California discussed at length the importance of class action 
remedies in California law and the development of “the hybrid procedure of class-wide 
arbitration.” 443  It also noted that appellate courts had answered affirmatively to the 
question whether “a class action waiver may be unenforceable as contrary to public policy 
or unconscionable” 444  Considering the same rule applied to class-action waivers in 
arbitration agreements, the court reasoned that: 
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in 
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior 
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers 
of consumers out of individually small sums of money, . . . the waiver becomes 
in practice the exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its] own fraud, 
or willful injury to the person or property of another.”445 
Under such circumstances, the court held, class-action waivers in arbitration agreements 
were “unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.”446 
5.2.1.2 Federal approach favoring efficient, streamlined resolution of disputes 
The US Supreme Court recently decided a challenge to the Discover Bank rule.
447
 It 
held that California’s rule compelling class arbitration “[was] not arbitration as envisioned 
by the FAA, lack[ed] its benefits, and there [could] not be required by state law.”448 
In 2002, A &  Mobility LCC (“A & ”) ran a sales campaign to advertise its 
services by offering free mobile phones. In 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion, residents 
of California, bought the service and received two free mobile phones. While the 
Concepcions had not been charged for the phones, they were billed $30.22 for sales tax on 
the basis of the phones’ retail value.  hey filed a complaint against AT&T, which was later 
merged with other similar complaints in a class action against AT&T, alleging that it had 
                                                 
443. Id. at 82 (citing Keating v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. 1982) (ordering class-wide 
arbitration of 7-Eleven franchisors’ claims where the arbitration agreement was silent on the matter), rev’d, 
appeal dismissed, Southland, 465 U.S. 1 (1994)). 
444. Id. at 83. In Szetela, the appellate court barred a contract containing a class arbitration waiver, holding 
the waiver to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. See Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866. 
 he waiver violated fundamental notions of fairness and public policy “by granting Discover a ‘get out of jail 
free’ card while compromising important consumer rights.” Id. at 868. Class action waivers were 
subsequently found unconscionable other California case. See, e.g., Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
813, 819–21 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 237–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005); Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728, 739–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
445. Discover Bank, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 85 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2013)). 
446. Id. at 87. 
447. AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
448. Id. at 1753. 
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engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on “free” mobile phones.449 
The adhesive contract between AT&T and the Concepcions authorized AT&T to make 
unilateral changes. It further included an arbitration clause providing for arbitration of all 
disputes between the parties in their “individual capacity”—i.e., not as members of a 
representative class.
450
  
AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the agreement after the Concepcions failed 
to pay the charged amount. The Concepcions argued that the arbitration agreement was 
unconscionable under the Discover Bank rule because it included a class-action waiver.
451
 
The Southen District of California agreed, holding that the arbitration provision 
unconscionable,
452
 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the provision was 
unconscionable under the Discover Bank rule and that the FAA did not preempt the 
Discover Bank rule because the rule was “a refinement of the unconscionability analysis 
applicable to contracts generally in California.”453 The FAA permits arbitration agreements 
to be invalidated by “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability.”454 The US Supreme Court granted certiorari and overturned the Ninth 
Circuit decisions, holding that the Discover Bank rule was inconsistent with the FAA, 
class-wide arbitration lacked the advantages of arbitration promoted by the FAA, and US 
state law could not require class-wide arbitration.
455
 
Justice Scalia, writing for the US Supreme Court, reasoned that the purpose of the 
FAA, as evident from the statutory text, was to ensure the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms “so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”456 In 
light of that purpose, the Court had previously held that parties might agree to limit the 
issues subject to arbitration,
457
 to arbitrate according to certain rules,
458
 and to limit with 
whom a party will arbitrate.
459
 The Court had allowed the parties discretion on these issues 
                                                 
449. Id. at 1744. 
450. Id. 
451. Id. at 1745. 
452. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167DMS AJB, 2008 WL 5216255, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 
11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, sub nom. 
AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
453. Laster, 584 F.3d at 856, rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
454. See, e.g., Doctor’s Associates, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); 
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989); Shearson, 482 U.S. 220, 226 
(1987). 
455. AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. 1740 
456. Id. at 1748. 
457. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
458. Volt, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). 
459. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1774 (2010).  
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to encourage “efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.” 460  In 
contrast, the Discover Bank rule interfered with arbitration: it allowed any party to a 
consumer contract to demand class-wide arbitration after a dispute had already begun.  
Moreover, the rule was unwieldy: it required that damages be small and the 
consumer to allege a scheme to cheat consumers. However, California courts had already 
held damages of $4,000 to be “small,” and the allegation requirement had “no limiting 
effect” at all.461  The rule was limited to contracts of adhesions, but as Justice Scalia 
commented, “[t]he times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive 
are long past.”462 
By allowing class-wide arbitration of such a vast swathe of agreements, the Discover 
Bank rule promoted a policy inconsistent with the FAA.
 463
 Class arbitration is inconsistent 
with the FAA because, first, it negated the informality of arbitration-- “[its] principal 
advantage”—by “requir[ing] procedural formality.” 464  Moreover, class arbitration is 
decidedly disadvantageous to the defendants.
465
 Finally, as a method of dispute resolution, 
“[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.” 466  Because the 
Discover Bank rule allowing class-wide arbitration did not have the purpose of enforcing 
arbitration agreements according to their terms, facilitating the streamlined resolution of 
disputes, it was pre-empted by the FAA. Class-wide arbitration thus could not be required 
by California law. 
5.2.2 Mandatory arbitration provisions are “unfair terms” under EU consumer 
law and cannot be enforced even where Member State law holds otherwise 
Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (the “Unfair Terms 
Directive”) is a major piece of consumer legislation in the EU.467  The Unfair Terms 
Directive purports to accomplish a partial harmonization of consumer law within EU.
468
 It 
sets minimum protection for the weaker party in consumer contracts—typically consumers. 
                                                 
460. AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1749. 
461. Id. at 1750. 
462. Id. at 1750 (citing Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
463. Id. at 1751. 
464. Id. 
465. Id. 
466. Id. at 1752. 
467. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 
95) 29 [hereinafter Unfair Terms Directive]; see UNDERSTANDING EU CONSUMER LAW 352–53 (Hans-W. 
Micklitz, N. Reich, P. Rott eds., 2009) [hereinafter EU CONSUMER LAW]. 
468. EU CONSUMER LAW, supra note 467, at 127. 
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Moreover, the Unfair Terms Directive aims to promote and enhance cross-border trade 
amongst the Member States and to combat distortions of competition law. 
The Unfair Terms Directive applies to “unfair terms” included in contracts of 
adhesion, pre-formulated terms, and individual terms.
469
 As discussed above, contracts of 
adhesion—referred to as “standard terms” in the Directive—are contracts including 
standard business conditions that are pre-formulated for repeated use by the offeror against 
consumers.
470
 Pre-formulated terms are those that have not been individually negotiated 
but which on their own do not exclude the application of the Directive to the rest of the 
contract if an overall assessment indicates that it is a contract of adhesion.
471
 Individual 
terms are less common. Micklitz has remarked, “[i]t is difficult to understand . . . when 
such individual terms in consumer contracts exist.” 472  Through case law, the CJEU 
concluded that it is within the power of a Member State court to, of its own motion, make a 
preliminary assessment as to whether a contract term is unfair before admitting a claim on 
that basis.
473
 When a Member State court finds that an unfair term renders a consumer 
contract void, it cannot, however, make that determination subject to the consumer’s 
observation of a notice period.
474
 
The Unfair Terms Directive covers only business-to-consumer transactions. The 
concept of a “consumer” in the Unfair Terms Directive is similar to that employed in other 
European Directives: “any natural person who . . . is acting for purposes which are outside 
his trade, business or profession.”475 The CJEU has strictly interpreted “consumer” to focus 
on the Directive’s protective purposes.  he term excludes self-employed persons and 
includes only natural persons.
476
 The seller or supplier with whom the consumer contracts 
may be “any natural or legal person who . . . is acting for purposes relating to his trade, 
business or profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned.”477  
                                                 
469. See Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 467, art. 2(a), art. 3. 
470. With regard to contracts of adhesion, the Directive shifts the burden of proof to prove a contract term 
has been individually negotiated to the seller or supplier. See Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 467, art. 
3(2). It also requires Member States to introduce special procedures with regard to standard terms so that 
contractual terms “drawn up for general use” may be removed from the contracts. See id. art. 7(2).  
471. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 467, art. 3(1). 
472. See EU CONSUMER LAW, supra note 467, at 129. 
473. Joined Cases 240 & 244/98, Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores, 2000 E.C.R. I-4941, at ¶ 29. 
474. Case C-474/00, Cofidis SA v Jean-Louis Fredout, 2002 E.C.R. I-10875, at ¶ 38. 
475. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 467, art. 2(b). 
476. See Joined Cases 541 & 542/99, Cape Snc v. Idealservice Srl and Idealservice MN RE Sas v. OMAI 
Srl, 2001 E.C.R. I-9049, at ¶¶ 14–15. 
477. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 467, art. 2(c). 
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Whereas US federal law worked to expand the application of arbitration to areas of 
consumer law previously thought within the confines of US state law (such as Discover 
Bank), the Unfair Terms Directive—a provision of European “federal” law—specifically 
limits arbitration in the field of consumer contracts. The Directive classifies a term as 
“unfair” if “it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and the obligations 
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”478 Furthermore, the Annex to 
Directive contains a non-exhaustive list of terms that may be regarded as unfair, including 
mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer contracts like those in dispute in AT&T 
Mobility.
479
 Such provisions were the subject of the Mostaza Claro and Asturcom cases.
480
 
Both cases, discussed in depth below, concern the intersection of arbitration and consumer 
law in the EU.  he cases exemplify “the impact of European law on private law.”481 
5.2.2.1 Mostaza Claro: EU consumer laws are a defense to enforcement of arbitral 
awards 
In Mostaza Claro, the CJEU held that EU consumer laws may be invoked as a valid 
defense against an arbitral award.
482
 Moreover, the court held that the Unfair Terms 
Directive provides a defense against arbitral awards in an action for annulment, even when 
the consumer did not plead the invalidity of the arbitral agreement during the arbitration 
proceedings.
483
  
Not unlikely the dispute in AT&T Mobility, the issue in contention in Mostaza Claro 
arose out of a mobile telephone contract. Ms. Mostaza Claro concluded a contract with 
Móvil, which contained an arbitration clause under which any dispute arising from the 
contract was to be referred for arbitration to the Asociación Europea de Arbitraje de 
                                                 
478. Id. art. 3. 
479. Id. annex 1, para. 1(q): “Excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise 
any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not 
covered by legal provisions.” 
480. Mostaza Claro, 2006 E.C.R. I-10437; Asturcom, 2009 E.C.R. I-9579. 
481. Hanna Schebesta, Does the National Court Know European Law? A Note on Ex Officio Application 
After Asturcom, 4 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 847, 849 (2010). 
482. See Bernd U. Graft & Arthur E. Appleton, Elisa María Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium: EU 
Consumer Law as a Defence Against Arbitral Awards, ECJ Case C-168/05, 25 ASA BULL. 48, 55 (2007); 
see also Bernd U. Graf & Arthur E. Appleton, ECJ Case C-40/08 Asturcom—EU Unfair Terms Law 
Confirmed as a Matter of Public Policy, 28 ASA BULL. 413, 413 (2010). 
483. Mostaza Claro, 2006 E.C.R. I-10437; see also Case Comment, Case C-234/08, Pannon GSM Zrt. v. 
Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi, Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 June 2009, not yet reported and 
Case C-40/08, Asturcom Telecominicaciones SL v. Maria Cristiba Rodriguez Nogueira, Judgment of the 
Court (First Chamber) of 6 October 2009, not yet reported, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 879, 898 (2010) 
[hereinafter Asturcom Case Comment]. 
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Derecho y Equidad (“AEADE”). 484  Ms. Claro failed to comply with the contractual 
minimum subscription period, and Móvil initiated arbitration proceedings against her 
before the AEADE. During the proceedings, Ms. Claro presented arguments on the merits 
of the dispute but did not claim that the arbitration agreement was void.
485
 AEADE issued 
a decision in favor of Móvil. Ms. Claro then contested the decision before the Audiencia 
Provincial de Madrid, arguing that the arbitration clause constituted an unfair term under 
the Unfair Terms Directive, thereby rendering the arbitration agreement null and void.
486
 
In its order for reference to the CJEU, the Audiencia Provincial stated that there was 
no doubt that the arbitration clause was an unfair term rending the agreement null and void. 
It wished to receive the CJEU’s opinion, however, as to whether Ms. Claro’s failure to 
contest the term during the arbitral proceedings precluded her from doing so in an 
annulment proceeding.
487
 
The CJEU invoked its case law to describe the nature of the system of protection 
introduced by the Unfair Terms Directive: consumers are in a weak position vis-à-vis 
sellers and suppliers with regard to both bargaining power and level of knowledge; 
consumers are unable to influence and thus usually accept the terms of consumer contracts 
which are drawn up in advance by sellers and suppliers; correcting the imbalance in this 
relationship requires positive action unconnected with contractual parties.
488
 To fulfill the 
Directive’s Article 6 aim of preventing individual consumers from being bound by unfair 
terms
489
 and its Article 7 aim of preventing the continued use of unfair terms in consumer 
contracts,
 490
 Member State courts have the power to determine of their own motion 
whether a term is unfair.
491
 The court reasoned that the protection conferred on consumers 
by the Directive extends to situations in which the consumer fails to raise the unfair nature 
of term, regardless of whether the consumer is unaware of his or her rights or is prevented 
                                                 
484. Mostaza Claro, 2006 E.C.R. at I-10443, ¶ 16. 
485. Id. ¶ 17. 
486. Id. at I-10444, ¶ 18. 
487. Id. ¶¶ 19–20 
488. Id. at I-10446, ¶¶ 25–26 (citing Océano Grupo, 2000 E.C.R. I-4941, at ¶¶ 25–27). 
489. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 467, art. 6(1):  
Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer 
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from exercising them due to the costs that would entail.
492
 Thus, if the Audiencia 
Provincial were to prohibit Ms. Claro from arguing the unfair terms defense in the 
annulment proceedings, the aim of the Directive to prevent individual consumes from 
being bound by unfair terms would be stymied and “the regime of special protection 
established by the Directive would be definitively undermined.”493  
In response to the Móvil’s argument that allowing a national court to determine 
whether an arbitration agreement is void even where the consumer did not make such 
claim during the arbitration proceeding would “seriously undermine the effectiveness of 
arbitration awards,” the CJEU conceded that review of arbitration awards must be limited 
in scope and that annulment of or refusal to recognize an award should be allowed only in 
exceptional circumstances.
494
 The court concluded, however, that the Eco Swiss case had 
established that where, under domestic rules of procedure, a Member State court must 
grant an application for annulment of an arbitration award on the basis of failure to observe 
national rules of public policy, it must also grant such an application where it is founded on 
failure to comply with rules of EU public policy.
495
 The CJEU reasoned that Article 6 of 
the Directive was a mandatory provision, expressing “the nature of importance of the 
public interest” of consumer protection.496  Thus, the court held that the Unfair Terms 
Directive required the Spanish court to determine whether the arbitration agreement was 
void and to annul the award where the agreement contains an unfair term, even though Ms. 
Claro had not made such an argument during the arbitral proceedings.
497
 
By referring to Eco Swiss, the CJEU strongly suggested, without explicitly stating, 
that consumer protection is part of EU public policy. The European Commission and 
Advocate General Tizzano presented divergent approaches to applying Eco Swiss in 
Mostaza Claro. In Eco Swiss, the court had interpreted Article 101 TFEU to be a rule of 
EU public policy because it constituted a “fundamental” provision which is “essential for 
the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the 
functioning of the internal market.”498 The Commission argued that the provisions of the 
Unfair Terms Directive could similarly be considered public policy because they were 
“harmonising provisions approved for the purpose of providing more efficient protection 
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for the consumer within the internal market.” 499 Thus, the provision contributes to the 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU
500
 aim of “strengthening of consumer protection.” 501  In the 
Commission’s view, Member State courts were required to ensure that the Directive’s 
provisions were enforced in actions for the annulment of arbitration awards, regardless of 
whether the failure to comply with the Directive had been raised during the arbitral 
proceedings.
502
 As discussed above, the CJEU sided with the Commission in its judgment.  
It is of significance, however, that the CJEU did not take the advice of Advocate 
General Tizzano, who favored a more narrow reading of EU public policy in the realm of 
consumer protection. Advocate General Tizzano worried that applying Eco Swiss to the 
facts in Mostaza Claro, as suggested by the Commission, would “give excessively wide 
scope to a concept, namely that of public policy, which traditionally refers only to rules 
that are regarded as being of primary and absolute importance in a legal order.”503 Instead, 
Advocate General Tizzano had suggested the court rule that failing to allow Ms. Claro to 
present the unfair term defense would comprise her right to a fair hearing.
504
 By rejecting 
the Advocate General’s narrower approach, the CJEU signaled that EU consumer law was 
a matter of public policy. Scholars have noted that the CJEU’s objective in Mostaza Claro 
was clear: to prevent the circumvention of EU consumer law provisions through the use of 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.
505
 This stands in stark contrast to the holding of 
the US Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility, which prohibited California from regulating the 
use of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. 
The facts in Mostaza Claro were specific to Spain, but the judgment has relevance 
for international arbitration. Provided that an arbitral award has an appropriate legal 
connection with the EU, the CJEU’s reasoning that Member State courts cannot overlook 
possibly unfair terms because the party seeking annulment failed to raise the claim during 
the arbitral proceedings is equally applicable to foreign and domestic arbitral awards. 
Mourre notes that Mostaza Claro “shows that the European Court may well be, in the 
future, willing to require national courts to exert a more stringent control on the way 
arbitrators apply EU law.”506 Another commentator stated that Mostaza Claro, as well as 
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Eco Swiss, make possible “revision of arbitral awards on the basis of [EU] law without a 
solid yardstick as to which [EU] rules constitute public policy.”507 
5.2.2.2 In Asturcom, the CJEU held that the principle of equivalence may require 
Member States courts to determine ex officio whether arbitration clauses are 
contrary to EU consumer law 
A dispute between a telecoms operator and a consumer was at issue in both Mostaza 
Claro and AT&T Mobility. The most recent CJEU case concerning EU consumer law and 
arbitration, Asturcom, also arose from a dispute between a telecommunications firm and a 
consumer.
508
 Whereas Mostaza Claro concerned the obligation of Member State courts to 
determine whether an arbitration clause was an unfair term during annulment proceedings, 
the obligation of Member State courts in award enforcement proceedings was at issue in 
Asturcom. The consumer, Mrs. Rodríguez Nogueira, contracted with Asturcom for a 
mobile telephone subscription. The contract included an arbitration clause but did not 
indicate that the seat of the tribunal was in Bilboa (far from Mrs. Nogueira’s home). 
Asturcom initiated proceedings against Mrs. Nogueira, and the tribunal issued an award in 
its favor. Mrs. Nogueira failed to initiate proceedings for annulment of the award, and it 
became final. In 2007, Asturcom brought an action before the Juzgado de Prime Instancia 
in Bilbao to enforce the award.
509
 The court sought a preliminary reference from the CJEU, 
asking whether: 
[T]he [Unfair Terms Directive] must be interpreted as meaning the national 
court or tribunal hearing an action for enforcement of an arbitration award 
which has acquired force of res judicata and was made in the absence of the 
consumer is required to determine of its own motion whether an arbitration 
clause in a contract concluded between a consumer and a seller or supplier is 
unfair and to annul award.
510
 
Judge Tizzano (formerly Advocate General Tizzano, the author of the Advocate 
General’s Opinion in Mostaza Claro) wrote the judgment of the CJEU in Austurcom.511 
The CJEU noted that the Unfair Terms Directive created a system of protection for 
consumers, premised on the idea that consumers are in a weak position vis-à-vis sellers. 
Article 6(1) of the Directive, providing that unfair terms are not binding on the consumer, 
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was, the CJEU reasoned, a “mandatory provision.”512 Furthermore, “positive action” was 
required to remedy the imbalance between sellers and buyers. In Mostaza Claro, the CJEU 
noted, such positive action had been necessary, and the CJEU thus required that national 
courts assess of their own motion whether a contractual term was unfair.
513
 
However, unlike the claimant in Mostaza Claro, Mrs. Nogueira did not involve 
herself in the arbitral proceedings. By failing to bring an action for annulment, Mrs. 
Nogueira had allowed the award to become final and acquire the status of res judicata. The 
CJEU reasoned that a Member State court could not be required “to make up fully for the 
total inertia on the part of the consumer.”514 The court thus held that the imposition of a 
time limit during which an award may be challenged was consistent with the principle of 
effectiveness, as it was “not in itself likely to make it virtually impossible or excessively 
difficult to exercise any rights which the consumer derives from [the Unfair Terms 
Directive].”515 
The CJEU then considered whether the Spanish court was required to determine of 
its own motion whether the arbitration clause was unfair and to annul the award under the 
principle of equivalence.  he principle of equivalence requires that “the conditions 
imposed by domestic law under which the courts and tribunals may apply a rule of [EU] 
law of their own motion must not be less favorable that those governing the application by 
those bodies of their own motion of rules of domestic law of the same ranking.”516 The 
CJEU noted that the Unfair Terms Directive was a mandatory provision and that the 
Directive was essential to the accomplishment of the tasks [of the EU] . . . in particular to 
raising the standard of living and the quality of life throughout [the EU].”517 Given the 
“nature and importance of the public interest” in protecting consumers, the court held, 
“Article 6 . . . must be regarded as a provision of equal standing to national rules which 
rank, within the domestic legal systems, as rules of public policy.”518 
By relying on the principle of equivalence, the CJEU rejected the proposed approach 
of Advocate General Trstenjak, who argued that the time limit during which an award may 
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be challenged was not in compliance with the principle of effectiveness.
519
 She supported 
the position that Member State courts have the power to determine of their own motion 
whether an arbitration clause is unfair and should be annulled by arguing that it “takes best 
account” of the aim of the Unfair  erms Directive—i.e., protecting consumers. 520 
Moreover, she reasoned, the principle of effectiveness was implicated by the wording of 
Article 7(1) of the Directive, proving that Member States employ “adequate and effective 
means” to protect consumers from unfair terms. 521  Such means must be “effective”, 
meaning that where a directive grants rights to individuals, Member States must 
“effectively . . . guarantee the rights.”522  
Thus where a Member State court is required by national procedural rules to assess 
of its own motion during an enforcement proceeding whether an arbitral agreement 
conflicts with domestic rules of public policy, it is simultaneously obliged to assess of its 
own motion whether that agreement is unfair under Article 6.
523
  
Asturcom reinforces the obligation created in Mostaza Claro for Member State courts 
to take into consideration, of their own motion, the Unfair Terms Directive in arbitration 
enforcement proceedings. Whereas, under US federal arbitration law, US state courts are 
prevented from considering state public policy when seized of actions for enforcement of 
awards, European state courts are required to apply federal public policy if state public 
policy would apply. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Public policy cannot be ignored by parties choosing to submit their disputes to 
international commercial arbitration. While arbitration is guided by party autonomy, the 
ultimate sovereignty of States demands that parties adhere to the State public policies. This 
position is reflected in the public policy exceptions to the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards included at Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention and 
Article 36(1)(b)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Moreover, the national legislation of 
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many States includes a specific exception to the recognition and enforcement of arbitration 
awards and agreements to arbitrate on grounds of public policy.  
In the United States and Europe, significant jurisprudence has developed, detailing 
the circumstances in which recognition or enforcement may be refused by a State court on 
public policy grounds. The exception is almost always interpreted narrowly. There is some 
dispute as what to “public policy” actually entails, but even the most liberal interpretation 
of the term leads to a narrow application. The best interpretation is to limit the public 
policy exception of Article V(2)(b) to the public policy of the State in which recognition or 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is sought. In France, the term is limited further to 
those French public policies that are of fundamental value and universally recognized. 
Scholars have proposed an ever more strict interpretation that would sever public policy’s 
connection to the enforcing State and only implicate those values that are recognized and 
applied by a majority of States. 
In Part 4, consideration was given to the practical application of the public policy 
exception in the courts of the US, the UK, and France. In the US, attempts to equate US 
foreign policy with US public policy have consistently been rejected. Attempts to equate 
federal substantive law with US public policy applicable to the recognition or enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards have been similarly unsuccessful. Even where federal law would 
disallow domestic arbitration of some matter—antitrust laws in Mitsubishi Motors or 
claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1932 in Scherk—federal courts have 
permitted its international arbitration. In a minority of cases, federal courts have used US 
public policies favoring international comity or disdaining agreements entered into under 
fraud or duress to refuse enforcement of arbitral awards, but these decisions have not been 
widely followed. Likewise, in the UK, the default position of courts is to grant recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards. In a number of rare cases, UK courts have refused 
enforcement where the underlying agreement was contrary to English law. And UK courts 
have consistently applied a high bar of “reprehensible or unconscionable conduct” to 
claims that an agreement was the product of fraud and should be refused recognition or 
enforcement. France, it was detailed, distinguishes between domestic and international 
public policy. This distinction makes it even harder from award-debtors to have the 
recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award refused in French courts. Moreover, 
French courts disregard the doctrine of comity and are uniquely willing to enforce even 
awards that have been set aside by courts at the place of arbitration. 
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Finally, in Part 5, the divergent paths takes by the highest courts in the US and in the 
EU to public policy in arbitration cases were detailed. In the US, the federalization of 
arbitration law has inhibited the ability of US states to prevent arbitration in matters of 
consumer law, whereas in the EU the federalization of consumer law has inhibited the 
ability of Member States to require arbitration of in such matters. In the US, the US 
Supreme Court has rejected the idea that antitrust laws are an expression of US public 
policy that cannot be adequately enforced through private arbitration. In the EU, it is 
generally recognized that such laws are an expression of EU public policy. Yet, while the 
position of the US Supreme Court and the CJEU has differed on these issues, the trend 
across the US and the EU is of the increasing popularity of commercial arbitration. 
